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Introduction
The modern administrative state depends in large part on fines, penalties,
restitution orders, and similar sanctions.1 Contemporary policy assumes that
the state, once it orders offenders to pay those sanctions, will collect them.2 This
Article suggests that we cannot depend on that assumption. Even where offenders are corporate or white-collar executives with the resources to pay, a fine imposed is in many cases not a fine collected. To the contrary, the available data
shows a massive gap between penalties imposed “on the books” and penalties
collected in reality.

1.

Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1436, 1445 (1979).

2.

See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-80, Criminal Debt:
Court-Ordered Restitution Amounts Far Exceed Likely Collections for
the Crime Victims in Selected Financial Fraud Cases 2 (2005) [hereinafter
GAO, Restitution 2005] (describing public expectation that perpetrators of
corporate fraud will pay fines imposed against them and analyzing to what extent
certain fines are actually collected).
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For decades, scholars have debated how best to calibrate government fines
and penalties3 to achieve optimal deterrence and other public policy goals.4 Particularly in the corporate context, where financial penalties are often the primary means of redressing both civil and criminal offenses,5 commentators have
disagreed whether assessing certain fines is fair or efficient.6 Some scholars have

3.

While fines, penalties, and restitution are distinct sanctions, such distinctions are
largely immaterial for our purposes. Thus, for convenience, we refer to all such
forms of civil and criminal monetary sanctions as “fines” unless otherwise indicated.

4.

See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 995 (1984) (arguing that the
uncertainty of application of legal rules creates systemic risks both of overcompliance and that wrongful behavior will go undetected, and that traditional
approaches to setting penalties to optimize behavior may not adequately account
for these phenomena); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities
Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2173 (2010) (arguing that
the risks of over- and under-deterrence can best be minimized by consolidated
enforcement authority in a centralized agency such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), but cautioning that misalignment between agency incentives
and the public interest may undermine efficiency gains). See generally Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169
(1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880, 880 (1979) (discussing
the parameters under which fines may or may not achieve optimal deterrence).

5.

See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, 1 Corporate Criminal Liability §§ 1.07-.08 (2d
ed. 1991); William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal
Procedures for Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 1-3
(1993); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1497-98 (1996); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of
Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death
Penalty, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 942-72 (2005).

6.

See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. Legal Stud. 833 (1994) (arguing that a corporate criminal liability regime
that fails to take into account internal enforcement efforts not only overdeters but
may actually increase crime); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and
the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 (2001) (arguing that
criminal enforcement does and should play a limited role in regulating corporate
wrongdoing due to, among other things, the ability of social norms to regulate
corporate conduct); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of
Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229 (2007) (analyzing the extent to which the level
of enforcement of regulations regarding corporate wrongdoing impacts the cost
of capital and financial development); Christopher Kennedy, Criminal Sentences
for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 443 (1985) (analyzing the fairness and efficiency of various forms of corporate fines vis-à-vis their
effect on shareholder and corporate management behavior); Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1715, 1751-52 (2006) (contrasting the
current approach to street crime with the “positive underenforcement” approach
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advocated minimal imposition of corporate fines because the negative impact of
such fines is arguably passed onto innocent parties, such as shareholders or
consumers.7 Others have posited theories explaining the benefits of regulators’
assessment of robust penalties against corporate offenders.8
However, existing scholarship has not seriously addressed what happens
after the state orders offenders to pay these sanctions. Instead, the administrative enforcement literature has essentially ignored to what extent offenders
actually pay the penalties imposed against them.
This Article seeks to describe empirically, for the first time, the degree to
which regulators follow through on enforcing corporate and white-collar fines
and penalties. Drawing on evidence from federal—and, to a lesser extent, state
and local9—government studies, Freedom of Information Act requests, media
reports, and agencies’ own formal and informal disclosures,10 we demonstrate a
fundamental disconnect between what offenders are ordered to pay and what
they actually do pay.
Administrative agencies never collect the vast brunt of regulatory and
criminal penalties.11 The U.S. Department of Justice, for example, has collected
in recent years less than 4% of criminal penalties and fines it imposes.12 Other
federal agencies collect at a similarly dismal rate.13 Agencies like the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Commodities and Futures Trading
Commission that regulate primarily well-financed companies tend to do better
than other federal agencies, although they still collect less than half of the penal-

to white-collar and corporate wrongdoing); Barry J. Pollack, Time To Stop Living
Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1393 (2009) (arguing that the current regime of vicarious criminal liability
for corporations is unduly broad, and that corporate liability should be tied more
directly to the intent of senior management).
7.

See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 6, at 448-50.

8.

See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6, at 235-36.

9.

The available state and local evidence is drawn largely, although not entirely, from
California.

10.

See infra Section II.A.

11.

See infra Part II.

12.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-04-338, Criminal Debt: Actions
Still Needed To Address Deficiencies in Justice’s Collection Processes 7
(2004) [hereinafter GAO, Criminal Debt 2004].

13.

See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-02-211, Civil Fines and
Penalties Debt: Review of OSM’s Management and Collection Processes
9 (2001) [hereinafter GAO, OSM 2001].
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ties offenders are ordered to pay.14 While data on state and local agencies is
more limited, it suggests they suffer from similar problems.15
The disconnect between enforcement expectations and enforcement reality
extends to agency attitudes. According to scholars, regulators impose fines to
deter misconduct, compensate victims, and generate government revenue.16
Ensuring offenders actually pay helps achieve those enforcement goals.17 Agencies, however, do not necessarily agree. The Environmental Protection Agency,
for example, views fine-collection as irrelevant to its enforcement function and
refuses to publicly disclose its collections figures.18
These findings have significant theoretical implications. They undermine
the “assumption of collection” underlying much of the discussion about
administrative fines and penalties. They also challenge accepted notions about
how administrative agencies understand their enforcement mission.
Moreover, exposure of the undercollection phenomenon could spark political controversy. Government agencies are failing to collect billions of dollars in
civil and criminal fines—even when the offenders possess the means to pay.19
During a recession in which governments are slashing budgets, cutting back
public services, and laying off workers, they are at the same time neglecting to
recover huge sums from corporations and executives that have actually been
found to have engaged in wrongdoing.
Particularly in such an economic environment, one would expect a
groundswell of support to push government agencies to improve their fine
collection rates. But neither the public, the press, nor the political branches has
said much about the problem, let alone sought explanations for why it is occurring.

14.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 03-795, SEC and CFTC Fines
Follow-Up: Collection Programs Are Improving, Further Steps Are
Warranted 21, 23-24 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003].

15.

John Chiang, Cal. Highway Patrol, S09-PRS-900, Report of Review:
Accounting and Administrative Processes and Procedures for Collecting Debt Due the State 11 (2009) [hereinafter Chiang, CHP Audit]; Mark
Madler, L.A.’s Deadbeat Tab: Staggering $559 Million, San Fern. Val. Bus. J., May
10, 2010, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies
-offices-regional/14568277-1.html.

16.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1456; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 446.

17.

Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717, 728
(2005) (“Only a threat that is perceived to be credible has the power to coerce.”
(emphasis omitted)); Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert,
and the Distribution of Punishments, 10 Can. J.L. & Juris. 441, 466 (1997) (“[I]n
order to maintain the credibility of its threats, punishments must actually be imposed on those who commit crimes.”).

18.

See infra text accompanying notes 165-173.

19.

See infra Parts II and III.
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This Article undertakes the first empirical and theoretical overview of the
problem of undercollection of government fines. We have amassed available
evidence regarding agencies’ collection rates, and have found that such rates are
pervasively low. We then take on the question of whether low collection rates
are in fact evidence of undercollection—i.e., are they the result of agency
failures, rather than merely being a product of rational decisions to forgo
collections; or are they the result of factors beyond the agencies’ control, such as
offenders’ inability to pay? We conclude that agencies must bear much of the
blame for their dismal collections performance.
After demonstrating that low collections are in fact undercollection, we
address the root causes. Applying theoretical models from psychology, administrative law, and organizational behavior,20 we examine the mechanisms behind
regulators’ failure to collect fines and penalties. Although insufficiency of
resources undoubtedly plays a role, individual and institutional incentives and
perceptions regarding the collections function are critical to collections performance. As we demonstrate, agency staffers tend to perceive collections as a
ministerial task that is “below them” or “someone else’s problem.”21 Likewise,
agency leaders may de-prioritize collections in favor of higher-profile tasks like
rule promulgation. Both of these phenomena systematically undermine collections performance. Agencies’ lack of a direct financial stake in money collected
from offenders compounds the problem: Administrative agencies typically do
not keep the money they collect, and individual collections personnel do not
get commissions or other performance-based incentives. Moreover, this
de-emphasis of the collections role contributes to (and is in part a result of) a
lack of inter- and intra-agency coordination regarding collections, further
exacerbating the problem.
Having described the phenomenon of undercollection and its causes, we
consider potential solutions. The possibilities range from incremental
improvements to radical restructurings. For example, we examine subtle ways
to “nudge” regulators toward a more positive perception of the collections
function.22 We also consider various strategies to reorder the flow of collected
funds to better reward strong performance. On the other end of the spectrum,
reform could mean removing collections responsibilities from the agencies. We
examine different ways in which agencies could delegate collections duties or
auction off penalty debt, and we analyze the benefits and risks of privatizing this
aspect of government enforcement. Although widespread reliance on private
collection agencies may ultimately provide the most promising approach to
20.

See, e.g., Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (1967); Herbert A. Simon,
Administrative Behavior (4th ed. 1997); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (2008).

21.

See infra text accompanying notes 306-313.

22.

See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 65 (“If choice architects want to
shift behavior and to do so with a nudge, they might simply inform people about
what other people are doing.”).
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boost collection rates, we conclude that, given the financial and political
constraints, intra-governmental reforms should be attempted first. If all of the
above-suggested efforts fail, then wholesale privatization of the collections function will be more palatable, and more demonstrably worth the potential risks.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we provide background
regarding the authority for, structure of, and rationales for the imposition of
civil and criminal fines. In Part II, we provide empirical evidence that low
collections rates are widespread. In Part III, we demonstrate that low collections
evidence undercollection. In Part IV, we examine potential explanations for
these collections failures at the individual, institutional, and systemic levels. In
Part V, we offer our recommendations for how to reform the collections
process.
I.

Structure of Administrative Fine Enforcement

The modern administrative state includes thousands of different agencies,
administrative bodies, and executive entities at the federal, state and local
levels.23 These bodies regulate practically every imaginable industry and subject
matter.24 Agencies enforce statutes, rules, and regulations through a variety of
means, but imposition of monetary sanctions (including fixed or variable fines
and penalties, and restitution25) is the primary enforcement tool.26
Administrative fines may be imposed in both the civil and criminal
contexts.27 Virtually every major administrative regulatory program contains
some type of monetary sanction.28 Sometimes, fines are the only available sanction.29
23.

See, e.g., Kenneth F. Warren, Administrative Law in the Political System
41 (4th ed. 2004) (tracking the growth of federal agencies from zero in 1789 to
nearly five hundred agencies by 2004); Agency Directory, State of Cal.,
http://www.ca.gov/CaSearch/Agencies.aspx (last visited June 28, 2010) (listing
nearly four hundred agencies in California alone).

24.

See Diver, supra note 1, at 1438 (listing a variety of such industries and subjects).

25.

Susan E. Nash, Collecting Overcharges from the Oil Companies: The Department of
Energy’s Restitutionary Obligation, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1039, 1056 n.97 (1980)
(“[C]ourts have granted other administrative agencies wide discretion in fashioning restitutionary remedies.”); Marshall L. Small, Limitations Imposed by the
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act on Use of PreJudgment Remedies To Enforce
Federal Administrative Agency Claims for Monetary Payments, 49 Bus. Law. 1541,
1542 (1994).

26.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1436, 1438, 1445.

27.

Funk, supra note 5, at 2; Small, supra note 25, at 1542.

28.

Laura J. Kerrigan et al., Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law
Penalties: Civil Remedies, Alternatives, Policy, and Constitutional Implications, 45
Admin. L. Rev. 367, 387 (1993) (noting that within the past twenty years, “the civil
fine has assumed a place of paramount importance in the search for a more effec459
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A. Purposes of Administrative Fines
Monetary remedies can serve various regulatory objectives. First and
foremost is deterrence: “[M]otivating future behavior” is “[t]he most obvious
and widely acknowledged” purpose of administrative fines.30 Such deterrence—
which includes both discouraging undesirable conduct and encouraging salutary behavior31—may be “general” (directed toward the general universe of actors
subject to regulation) or “specific” (directed to rule violators themselves).32
A second potential purpose for administrative fines is compensation.33
Restitution is designed specifically to compensate identifiable victims; whereas
other civil and criminal monetary remedies are generally not geared toward this
purpose.34
A third purpose is punishment.35 Although as a practical matter, money
remedies sought in civil proceedings may have a punitive motivation,36 generally only criminal fines are considered “retributive.”37 That is because “[i]f
Congress intended the penalty to be punishment, then the sanction is viewed as

tive enforcement tool” (citing Diver, supra note 1, at 1436)); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale
L.J. 1795, 1844 (1992) (“In 1979, Colin Diver found that twenty-seven federal
departments and independent agencies enforced 348 civil statutory penalties.
Since that time, Congress has added new punitive civil sanctions, increased their
size, and made their imposition procedurally easier.” (footnotes omitted)); Small,
supra note 25, at 1542.
29.

Kerrigan et al., supra note 28, at 387.

30.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1456; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 446 (“The mainstream of
commentary . . . has settled on a utilitarian rationale for the corporate fine, with
deterrence as its centerpiece.”); see, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105
(1997) (noting that monetary penalties under the Federal Reserve Act and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act are “intended to deter future wrongdoing”); United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 232 (1975) (noting that Federal
Trade Commission Act civil penalties are designed to “provide a meaningful deterrence against violations”).

31.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1456.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.; see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938) (explaining that penalties under the revenue laws are intended in part “to reimburse the Government
for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s
fraud”).

34.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1456.

35.

Id. at 1456 n.136.

36.

Mann, supra note 28, at 1807-08.

37.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1456 n.136; Kerrigan et al., supra note 28, at 387.
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‘criminal’ in nature, entitling the defendant to the constitutional procedural
safeguards of criminal proceedings.”38
Finally, fines and penalties generate revenue,39 which can fund government
programs and operations, offset the burden on taxpayers, and help pay down
budget deficits.40 Although fundraising is not always an express purpose of particular fines,41 it can be one of their most direct and measurable effects.
B. Fine Enforcement Processes
In this Section, we describe the processes by which administrative agencies
enforce fines and penalties against violators. We provide an overview of the
ways agencies (and/or courts) (1) initially assess these fines; (2) mitigate, or
reduce, the amounts they initially assess; and (3) collect money owed by violators.
1. Initial Fine Assessment
There are several means by which monetary sanctions may be assessed
against violators of administrative statutes, rules, or regulations. These mechanisms include judicially-imposed fines, fines assessed by administrative agencies,
and informal administrative assessments.

38.

Kerrigan et al., supra note 28, at 372 (“If, on the other hand, the statute has a
legitimate nonpunitive purpose, the defendant is merely afforded the procedural
safeguards of a civil action.”).

39.

Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 780 (1994); Kerrigan et al., supra
note 28, at 377 (“[C]ivil remedies also have the potential of providing the government with much needed funds.”).

40.

See Diver, supra note 1, at 1456 (describing the use of fines to compensate the
government for the loss the violator caused); Press Release, Cal. State Controller’s
Office, Chiang Finds Massive Losses from Uncollected Fines and Penalties (Apr.
16, 2009), http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo_pressrel_5688.html [hereinafter SCO Press
Release] (noting that the state “loses millions of dollars each year because state
agencies often fail to collect the fines and penalties they levy”); Daniel Pearce,
Unpaid Fines Hit $3M: County Hires Another Collection Agency To Go After
Offenders, Simcoe Reformer, http://www.simcoereformer.ca/ArticleDisplay.aspx
?archive=true&e=1080189 (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (“The $3 million in collectibles represents close to six per cent [sic] of the annual amount in taxes the
county collects every year.”); Team #4: State Failing To Collect Millions in Unpaid
Fines, WTAE.com, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.thepittsburghchannel.com/team4/
17949994/detail.html [hereinafter Pennsylvania Fines Report] (“[T]he state is
owed more than $14 million in fines and fees at a time when the state is facing a
more than half-billion dollar budget hole.”).

41.

By contrast, taxes are typically explicitly directed toward revenue-generation.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780.
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First, civil or criminal fines or penalties may be judicially imposed.42 Standard distinctions between criminal and civil cases (such as differences in the
burden of proof and persuasion) apply,43 but all court-imposed fines require the
commencement of a case and a formal finding of guilt or liability by a judge or
jury, as applicable.44 For example, the Clean Water Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to file a lawsuit in federal court to pursue civil
penalties against violators.45
Second, administrative agencies may assess civil penalties through the
“formal” administrative penalty process, which mirrors the judicial procedure,
but without an elected or Article III judge or jury.46 An administrative law judge
generally makes a recommended decision about the violation and the amount
of the penalty.47 After providing an opportunity for parties to object, the agency
makes a final decision. The decision may be judicially reviewed under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or a specific state review statute.48
Third, an even more informal administrative assessment procedure may be
statutorily permitted.49 The agency unilaterally raises the allegations of a violation, makes non-judicial findings, and sets the penalty.50 Congress has often

42.

Funk, supra note 5, at 1-3. Some statutes prohibiting a given type of misconduct
can give rise to both criminal and civil penalties. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)
(2006) (criminal penalties for water pollution); id. § 1319(d) (civil penalties for
water pollution).

43.

Funk, supra note 5, at 1-3.

44.

Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Funk, supra note 5, at 1-3; see also 33
U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006) (listing factors a court shall consider in determining a
penalty).

45.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).

46.

5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (2006); Funk, supra note 5, at 1-3.

47.

All Regions Chem. Labs, Inc. v. EPA, 932 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1991); Funk, supra note
5, at 2.

48.

For example, the APA broadly provides that persons “aggrieved” by any agency
action, or who wish to challenge a final agency ruling, may seek judicial review.
5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. The APA generally requires the reviewing court to uphold
the agency determination if supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E); Funk, supra note 5, at 2. The amount of the penalty, as opposed to
the fact of violation, may be reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard, because the fixing of a penalty amount is considered an important exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8) (providing for
substantial evidence review of the finding of violation and abuse of discretion
review for the amount of the penalty).

49.

Funk, supra note 5, at 3.

50.

Id.
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authorized such informal procedures for smaller penalties, while requiring formal processes for larger penalties or penalties for continuing violations.51
Through either formally assessed administrative penalties or those imposed
by an informal agency procedure, administrative agencies often have substantial
but not unlimited discretion to determine the amount of a penalty. Many civil
penalty statutes or authorizing regulations impose lower and upper limits on
penalty amounts.52 They also provide guidance on how to exercise discretion
within the permitted range of penalty amounts, by listing factors to be considered in determining the penalty.53 For example, the Toxic Substances Control
Act54 requires the EPA to consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity
of the violation or violations; the violator’s ability to pay; the effect of any penalty on the violator’s ability to continue to do business; any history of prior
violations; and the degree of culpability.55 Most statutory guidelines contain
similar factors.56
2. Fine Mitigation
Many administrative agencies have the express power to mitigate, i.e.,
compromise or wholly write off, monetary penalties after initial assessment.57 In

51.

Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (requiring formal adjudication for Class II
penalties), with 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (explicitly mandating non-APA proceedings for Class I penalties); compare 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b) (2006) (requiring formal
adjudication for Class II penalties), with 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a) (implicitly providing
for non-APA proceedings for Class I penalties); compare 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(2)
(requiring formal adjudication for Class II penalties), with 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(1)
(implicitly providing for non-APA proceedings for Class I penalties).

52.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1441; see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13a (2006) (providing a $500,000
maximum penalty for individual violation of rules in contracts markets); 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a) (2006) (providing, as part of the False Claims Act, for penalties of “not
less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000”); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (providing
$50,000 maximum for ocean dumping).

53.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1441.

54.

15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).

55.

Id. § 2615(a)(2)(B).

56.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1441; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4585(c)(2) (2006) (National Housing Act); 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(c) (FTC unfair competition); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(d) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 21 U.S.C. § 333(g)(3)(B) (2006)
(Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(f) (2010) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).

57.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 7, 13; Diver, supra note 1, at 1440. One (cynical)
view of the rationale for granting agencies such liberal mitigation authority is that
it serves to augment agency power at the expense of the rights of those subject to
regulation. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring, and Informally Adjudicating, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 215
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many cases, mitigation clauses are found in the same statutory provision authorizing the penalty itself; alternatively, some agencies have general mitigation
authority applicable to many or all of the civil money penalties that they
enforce.58
The limitations on agencies’ mitigation authority vary. Although the statutory sources of mitigation power often do not provide detailed criteria regarding the exercise of that power,59 many agencies have internal guidelines
regarding when penalty debt may be written off, e.g., when the cost of collection
is excessive or where the debtor cannot be located.60 In some instances, writeoffs may not be permitted unless another agency, such as the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) or the state Attorney General’s Office, approves.61 Agency procedures may also limit the amount by, or the circumstances under, which a penalty may be reduced or payment deferred.62 As we demonstrate below, however, agencies routinely deviate from their own procedures in mitigating fines and
penalties.63

(1949) (“The maximum penalties are always initially imposed, although Congress
could not have intended such penalties to be collected. Nevertheless, the customary attitude is that mitigation is an act of grace and that the alleged offender has
neither substantive nor procedural rights.”); see also infra text accompanying
notes 181-207 for discussion of concerns raised by agencies’ employment of the
power to mitigate.
58.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1443. Even in the absence of an express mitigation power,
federal agencies have a general authority to compromise money penalty claims
under the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966, which authorizes the “head of an
agency” to “compromise . . . claims of the United States for money or property
arising out of the activities of, or referred to, his agency.” Id. at 1444.

59.

Id. at 1443.

60.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 7.

61.

Chiang, CHP Audit supra note 15, at 8 (“[California s]tate departments that wish
to write off their accounts receivable are required to file a Request for Discharge
From Accountability with the Victim Compensation and Government Claims
Board (VCGCB) through the [State Controller’s Office] and/or the Attorney General’s Office (AGO).”); GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 7.

62.

U.S. Gov’t Acccountability Office, GAO-02-116, Civil Fines and Penalties
Debt: Review of CMS’s Management and Collection Processes 6 (2001)
[hereinafter GAO, CMS 2001] (noting that internal Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) procedures dictate that the CMS should not reduce a
penalty by more than 35% if the violator did not timely waive its right to an administrative hearing); GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that OSM policies discussing agency payment plans depend on certain circumstances for debtors).

63.

See infra text accompanying notes 172-187.
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3. Fine Collection
This Subsection describes the mechanisms by which administrative agencies collect fines. We highlight several key aspects of these mechanisms, including: the fragmentation of collection responsibilities within or among different
agencies; the discretion entrusted to agencies with respect to collections; and the
process by which collected funds enter the government’s coffers.
There is generally no centralized entity tasked with, nor a standardized
process for, collecting government fines, even in the federal system. Instead,
collections responsibilities are largely dispersed among different agencies.
In the criminal context, district court judges initially determine any fine or
restitution to be paid,64 as well as related matters such as the propriety of payment plans.65 Consistent with judicial assessment of fines, most criminal fines
must be paid to the court clerk’s office.66
However, it is DOJ, not the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, which is charged with initiating criminal fine collections.67 In other
words, although the courts assess criminal fines and ultimately receive payment
of them, a different entity—DOJ—is charged with pursuing payment of those
amounts.68 DOJ then delegates collections to the ninety-four United States
Attorneys’ Offices located in each federal district throughout the country.69
Each local United States Attorney’s Office, in turn, entrusts collections to its
own Financial Litigation Unit (FLU), which operates within each office’s Civil
Division.70 The FLUs within each district maintain their own separate databases
to meet their enforcement responsibilities.71
Although FLU personnel are primarily responsible for ensuring offenders
pay amounts due to the court, personnel from the Bureau of Prisons, as well as
the court system’s probation offices, also get involved.72 For example, the
Bureau of Prisons provides a means of collecting voluntary periodic deductions

64.

U.S. Gov’t Acccountability Office, GAO-01-664, Criminal Debt: Oversight and Actions Needed To Address Deficiencies in Collection
Processes 26-27 (2001) [hereinafter GAO, Criminal Debt 2001].

65.

Id.

66.

Id. at 29.

67.

Id. at 28.

68.

Id. at 29.

69.

Id.

70.

Id. at 10.

71.

Id. at 29.

72.

Id.
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from inmates’ wages earned from prison occupations.73 And probation officers
can use unpaid fines as a basis on which to restrict the activities of offenders.74
Fine assessment and collections in the civil context can be similarly fragmented. For example, DOJ personnel, not EPA officials, are primarily responsible for resolving civil judicial enforcement actions involving environmental
violations.75 Although the EPA generates penalty estimates for such cases, those
estimates do not govern DOJ’s decisions.76 As for collection of fines, the EPA
itself collects administrative fines through its office of its Chief Financial Officer, whereas civil judicial penalties are collected through DOJ and individual
United States Attorney’s Offices.77
There is, however, one unifying thread in the federal system: Federal agencies are usually required to transfer fine debt that is more than 180 days delinquent to the Treasury Department’s Financial Management Services. Financial
Management Services is then required to take appropriate steps to collect the
debt or terminate collection actions.78 But as will be discussed below, agencies
often fail to timely refer all eligible debt to Financial Management Services as
required, undermining consistency.79
Collections practices are also often fragmented within agencies, although
there are significant variations. In many cases, the specific personnel collecting
fines have both collection and non-collection duties. For example, at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), some staff attorneys are responsible for a
variety of functions, including investigating potential violations of securities
law, recommending enforcement actions, prosecuting the SEC’s civil suits,
negotiating settlements, and conducting collection activities for fines levied.80
73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-1111R, Environmental Enforcement: EPA Needs To Improve the Accuracy and Transparency of
Measures Used To Report on Program Effectiveness 4 (2008) [hereinafter
GAO, EPA 2008].

76.

Id. at 10.

77.

Id. at 16, Enclosure II.

78.

See 31 U.S.C. § 3711(g)(1) (2006); GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003, supra note 14, at 7.
Financial Management Services can use traditional methods of collecting debt,
like sending demand letters and hiring private collection agencies. GAO, SEC and
CFTC 2003, supra note 14, at 7. In addition, the Service can use the Treasury Offset Program, which identifies federal payments (e.g., tax refunds) that are owed to
individuals and applies the payments to their outstanding debt. Id.

79.

See infra text accompanying notes 272-273.

80.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 05-670, SEC and CFTC Penalties:
Continued Progress Made in Collection Efforts, but Greater SEC Management Attention Is Needed 20 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, SEC and CFTC
2005].
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Although much of the available data involves federal agencies, the problem is by
no means confined to the federal arena. Collection responsibilities at the California Public Utilities Commission, for example, float among staff in no less
than five different divisions within the Agency.81
Other agencies, by contrast, delegate civil debt collection work to private
collection agencies.82 But such delegations take different forms. An agency may
enter into an exclusive contract with a given debt collector.83 Or the agency may
contract with multiple collection agencies, providing more work to highperformers.84
Collection personnel generally have substantial discretion in utilizing
collection tools. Methods include filing liens, identifying debtor assets, garnishing debtor wages, and serving notice of late payments.85 Agencies can also
initiate installment or payment plans for debtors that cannot pay the full debt
immediately,86 although the agencies’ own policies may curb this discretion.87
Many agencies are also required to report information about their fine collections to oversight agencies, such as the federal Office of Management and
Budget or the state Controller’s Office.88
Fines collected by agencies typically go to general coffers rather than to the
collecting agency. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act89 requires that all monies
received on behalf of the federal government must be deposited with the United
States Treasury.90 Although a number of agency authorizing statutes override
81.

John Chiang, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Report of Review: Fines and Restitution Accounting and Collection 9 (2007) [hereinafter Chiang, CPUC
Audit].

82.

Pearce, supra note 40; Teresa Moore, County Seeks Help Recovering Unpaid Fines,
Ironton Trib., Feb. 21, 2009, at 1A, 3A.

83.

Moore, supra note 82.

84.

Pearce, supra note 40.

85.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 29.

86.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 13; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64,
at 29.

87.

See infra notes 205-216; see also GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 13.

88.

GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 29; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 15; see
Chiang, CHP Audit supra note 15, at 7 (noting that California agencies must
properly record receivables balances for review by the Controller’s Office, the
State Department of Justice and the Victims’ Compensation and Government
Claims Board).

89.

31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2006).

90.

There are certain exceptions. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1363(a)(3)-(4) (2006) (authorizing the retention and use of sums collected in connection with undercover immigration investigations for limited periods); 19 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006) (authorizing
the imposition of costs of collecting customs duties, and allowing a department to
retain those sums to cover debt collection expenses). Thus, whether an agency
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this act by allowing an agency to keep fines that it collects, many do not.91 Thus,
agencies that collect fines often do not retain the fruits of their efforts.
This Part provided relevant background on fines and their purposes, the
processes by which they are administered, and the fragmented nature of how
they are assessed and collected. In the Parts that follow, we describe the
evidence demonstrating low collection rates among administrative agencies,
and then discuss the ways in which current fine collections processes contribute
to low collections and ultimately undermine some of the core purposes of fines
and penalties levied by administrative agencies.
II. Evidence of Low Fine Collection Rates
In this Part, we describe our methodologies for gathering and interpreting
agency collections data from different sources, as well as obstacles we faced in
amassing such data. We then present our analysis of current fine collection rates
among a cross-section of federal and some state agencies. We conclude that the
data demonstrates a systemic failure to substantially collect fines and penalties
originating with administrative agencies.
A. Research Methodology
1. Data Sources
Given the historic inattention to the issue of collection of administrative
fines, we sought to be the first to collect, distill, and analyze relevant information across multiple agencies. This required us to locate and synthesize data
from a variety of disparate sources, including audits, responses to informational
requests and questionnaires, financial reports, and press releases.
We started with financial audits conducted by the federal government. For
example, we located reports of audits by the United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO), which investigates the efficiency and effectiveness
of other federal government agencies.92 Each report addressed the collection
retains fines collected, and the extent to which and/or circumstances under which
they do so, may vary from agency to agency. However, the default is that the
agencies do not retain the amounts collected.
91.

This issue has been particularly controversial with regard to the EPA. See, e.g.,
Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power: Why Congress Should
Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 327, 347-48,
351-58 (discussing the issue of DOJ entering into settlements under the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts which involve “supplemental environmental projects,” as
opposed to monetary payments, so as to avoid the requirements of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act).

92.

See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13; GAO,
Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64;
GAO, EPA 2008, supra note 75; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO

468

Article

- Ross-Pritikin - 20 - Final - 2011.05.31

6/3/2011 10:12 AM

THE COLLECTION GAP

practices of a major federal administrative agency, e.g., DOJ, EPA, SEC, the
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, Treasury’s United States
Customs Service (Customs),93 the Department of Health and Human Services’
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining.94
These government audits were a significant source of collections data. The
GAO received substantial cooperation from agencies during investigations and
was able to gather volumes of collections-related financial data for a variety of
time periods for each agency.95 The GAO also researched and tested agencies’
systems and procedures for tracking collections data.96 This information helped
us evaluate the reliability and any potential distortions of agencies’ collections
figures. Further, the GAO interviewed officials at each agency for more information about specific collections tactics, problems, and strategies.97 Descriptions from these interviews helped us pinpoint specific causes of agencies’ low
collection figures. Finally, these audits included written responses from the
agencies,98 which revealed regulators’ sometimes telling views about the role of
collections in the agencies’ overall enforcement functions.
We also tracked down several audits of agencies at the state level. For
example, we found helpful information in audits by the California State Controller of the Department of Industrial Relations and the Highway Patrol,
02-655, Review of U.S. Customs Service’s Management and Collection
Processes (2002) [hereinafter GAO, Customs 2002]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 07-830, Securities and Exchange Commission: Additional
Actions Needed To Ensure Planned Improvements Address Limitations
in Enforcement Division Operations (2007) [hereinafter GAO, SEC 2007];
GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003, supra note 14; GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note
80.
93.

In 2003—after the GAO conducted its audit—the Customs Service was dissolved
to form part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and was split into the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Division. See History: Who Became Part of the Department, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/
editorial_0133.shtm.

94.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13.

95.

See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 4; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 3;
GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 5-6.

96.

See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 4-5; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at
3; GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 6; GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003,
supra note 14, at 11.

97.

See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 4; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at
3-4; GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 6.

98.

See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 68; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at
67-69; GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 24-27; GAO, SEC and CFTC
2003, supra note 14, at 36-38.
469

Article

- Ross-Pritikin - 20 - Final - 2011.05.31

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

6/3/2011 10:12 AM

29 : 453

2011

among others.99 Like the federal audits, these reports provided collectionsrelated financial data for a variety of time periods, assessed agencies’ internal
controls and data tracking systems, and included information from interviews
with agency officials.100
In addition to assembling data from various government reports and
audits, we conducted a campaign to unearth more information. For example,
we submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to a dozen federal
agencies101 seeking, among other things: (1) data regarding fine assessments and
collections, either collectively or in individual cases; and (2) documents reflecting the agencies’ reasons for collecting less than the total amount of fines
assessed (again, either collectively or individually).102 We also submitted a questionnaire regarding fine collection procedures and performance statistics to
agencies in all fifty states and a sampling of federal agencies.103 In these questionnaires, we sought information about collections personnel, collection budgets, amounts actually collected and data about any use of private collection
companies. Furthermore, we reviewed fine and penalty-related information
posted on the websites for federal, state and local agencies and regulatory bodies
throughout the country. We examined both periodic financial reports on agency websites, as well as enforcement-related press releases.
Finally, we sought additional anecdotal data. We researched press and
media reports addressing administrative fine collection, in addition to seeking
some anecdotal information through the FOIA.104 We also conferred with jour-

99.

Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15; John Chiang, Dep’t of Indus. Relations,
Report of Review: Accounting and Administrative Processes and Procedures for Collection of Debt Due the State (2008) [hereinafter Chiang,
DIR Audit].

100. Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 5-6; Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at
6-7.
101.

These agencies included the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Consumer Products Safety Commission, U.S. Customs Service, Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Office of Surface Mining, and SEC.

102. FOIA requests are on file with the authors.
103.

Questionnaires, and the agency responses, are on file with the authors.

104. See, e.g., Martha Mendoza & Christopher Sullivan, More Corporations Stiffing Government on Fines, CorpWatch, Mar. 19, 2006, http://www.corpwatch.org/
article.php?id=13415; Ross Todd, Three Cents on the Dollar: Convicted White-Collar
Criminals Owe Billions in Restitution. Getting Them To Pay It Is Another Story,
Am. Law., Nov. 1, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC
.jsp?id=1193821428808.
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nalists and others who had written about fine collections.105 Where we relied on
data from these reporters, we confirmed they had discovered the information
via the FOIA process.106
2. Problems with Agency Data
Although our efforts created a snapshot of the state of regulatory fine
collection, we confronted obstacles in assembling reliable data. These obstacles
stemmed from agencies’ data-tracking problems and unwillingness to disclose
certain information. More specifically, we confronted shortcomings in agencies’
own collections records, limits on information agencies voluntarily disclosed,
and agencies’ incomplete responses to our FOIA requests.
Many agencies’ internal controls raise concerns about their collectionrelated data. For example, the SEC’s Inspector General determined that the
Agency’s system for tracking cases with money judgments “was not complete
and accurate and could not be relied upon for financial accounting and reporting purposes.”107 The SEC replaced its system, but the new system was still
“severely limited,”108 e.g., it was unable to produce detailed reports on certain
types of investigations.109 The tracking systems used by DOJ’s Financial Litigation Units (FLUs) for federal criminal fines failed to capture certain data
altogether, such as court-ordered terms of repayment,110 and did not permit the
FLUs to allocate outstanding debts between amounts likely to be collected and
those not likely to be collected.111 The California Highway Patrol was wholly
unable to calculate the amount of underbilled penalties because its system for
tracking debt collection had “inadequate controls . . . to ensure the accuracy,
reliability, and completeness” of its recovery billings.112 A 2007 report from the
Los Angeles City Controller concluded that the city simply did not know its
total account receivables.113 To minimize the problems posed by these data
105.

We contacted Martha Mendoza, co-author of More Corporations Stiffing Government on Fines, to discuss her article and research. Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note
104. We also contacted Timothy L. Dickinson, practicing attorney and the author
of The Past Year in Review: Another Banner Year for Enforcement, in The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 2009: Coping with Heightened Enforcement Risks
185 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 18,499, 2009).

106. Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 104.
107.

GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003, supra note 14, at 11.

108. GAO, SEC 2007, supra note 92, at 4.
109. Id.
110.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 43, 54.

111.

Id. at 54.

112.

Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 10.

113.

Madler, supra note 15.
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flaws, we relied where possible on data tested and audited by government investigators. Further, as described below, agencies’ information-tracking problems
likely overstate how well they are following through on fine collection. Thus,
these problems do not undermine, and if anything reinforce, our core finding
of low collection of penalties by administrative agencies.
Another obstacle to gathering information was that agencies voluntarily
disclose limited information on their websites and in annual reports.114 For example, individualized press releases typically disclose only the amount of claims
initially sought against regulated companies, or at best the amount of fines
eventually imposed or assessed; these disclosures leave the reader to speculate as
to whether those amounts were or ever will be collected.115 Even agencies that
publish annual reports regarding the results of agency-wide collections efforts,
including the totals of all fine and restitution awards,116 sometimes disclose only
amounts assessed, not amounts collected.117 In some cases, these reported
figures include amounts awarded in default judgment cases, where even fractional collections may be impossible.118 One government investigator stated that

114.

See, e.g., Air Resources News Room, Cal. Air Resources Board, http://
www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/newsrel.php (last visited Aug. 6, 2010); Justice News,
Dep’t Justice, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/ (last visited Aug. 6,
2010) (listing press releases by month with fine assessment reports); News: 2009
Press Releases, Cal. Dep’t Insurance., http://insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100press-releases/0080-2009/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2010) (listing press releases
that concern fines, among other news items); News & Events: Press Announcements, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/default.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2010); Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., http://www.dir.ca.gov/dirnews/link_page.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2010) (cataloging press releases that concern fines); Recent Press Releases, Sec. &
Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/news/press.shtml (last visited Aug.
6, 2010) (containing press releases that detail initial charges brought); see also infra
text accompanying notes 174-180 for discussion of agencies’ ostensible motives for
limiting disclosures about collections data.

115.

See supra note 114. Press releases on agencies’ website sometimes link directly to
documents ordering payment of fines, but these likewise shed light only on
amounts assessed, not collected. See, e.g., Administrative Proceedings, Sec. & Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.shtml (last visited
Aug. 6, 2010) (linking to orders for payment of fines and other relief); Newsroom,
Fed. Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/index.shtml (last visited Aug.
6, 2010) (listing news releases, complaints and orders for relief).

116.

Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results (2008) [hereinafter EPA, Annual Results 2008], available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
reports/endofyear/eoy2008/fy2008results.pdf.

117.

Id. at 33.

118.

Id. at 31.
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these selective disclosures “overstat[e] the impact of [a particular agency’s] enforcement programs.”119
Finally, many agencies to which we submitted formal and informal requests
for additional information resisted providing any data that was not already on
their websites. For example, most agencies provided no response to our informal questionnaire and, of those that did respond, none provided information
comparing the amount of fines collected to amounts assessed or imposed, the
key area of interest.120 And although we did receive responses to our FOIA
requests, many agencies objected that the requested records were either privileged or did not exist (and asserted no obligation to create them). Of the information agencies did disclose in response to our FOIA requests, most consisted
of the same material available on the agencies’ websites. Several agencies made
voluminous production of court pleadings and documents from particular case
files, which provided information regarding amounts assessed, but nothing
about amounts actually collected.121
B. Available Data Demonstrates Pervasively Low Collections
In this Section, we present aggregate data showing widespread collections
failures; describe low collection rates on an agency-by-agency basis; and enumerate reasons why actual collection rates are likely even lower than the data
reflect.
1. Aggregate Data
The information that is available demonstrates a systemic failure to collect
a substantial portion of assessed government fines. For instance, one source
reported that in 2004, federal authorities assessed $7.8 billion in fines in criminal and civil cases, but collected less than half of that amount.122 Yet the true
collection figure is likely even worse: The $7.8 billion figure reflects only newly
imposed fine debt, not all outstanding fine debt, including older uncollected
debt—a much larger number. The same source conservatively estimated123 that
119.

GAO, EPA 2008, supra note 75, at 3, 6. Agencies’ selective disclosures apparently
support Anthony Downs’ hypothesis that “[o]fficials’ perceptions will operate so
as to partially screen out data adverse to their own interests, and magnify those
favorable to their interests.” Downs, supra note 20, at 272.

120. Documentation regarding the questionnaire and agency responses is on file with
the authors.
121.

These FOIA requests and the agency responses are on file with the authors.

122.

Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 104.

123.

Another source put the federal criminal debt balance alone in 2006 at $46 billion.
Enhanced Financial Recovery and Equitable Retirement Treatment Act of 2007;
Hearing on H.R. 2878 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Sec., 110th Cong. 27 (2007) (statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Director, Exec. Of473
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as of 2006, the federal government was owed more than $35 billion in total outstanding fines.124 Thus, if agencies collected several billion dollars in fines, the
true overall collection rate would be more like 10% of the total, not 50%.
The volume of outstanding federal fine debt grows each year, and so is undoubtedly much larger now: The cited $35 billion fine debt figure itself
represented a nearly five-fold increase over the previous decade.125 Similarly, the
uncollected federal criminal debt balance grew from $16 billion to $25 billion
between 2000 and 2002.126 Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth of uncollected
criminal debt from 1995-2002, as well as the stagnation of amounts annually
collected by DOJ:

Figure 1: Uncollected Federal Criminal Debt127
Outstanding fines owed to state and local governments are also substantial.
Audits of just three out of California’s more than four hundred agencies
showed over $80 million in uncollected fines as of 2008,128 and this did not even
fice for U.S. Att’ys) [hereinafter Melson Testimony]. Neither this congressional
testimony nor the research by Mendoza and Sullivan provides sufficient data to
explain the discrepancy.
124.

Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 104.

125.

Id.

126.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 7.

127.

This graph is drawn from the GAO’s 2004 report on criminal debt. Id. at 8 fig.1.

128.

SCO Press Release, supra note 40.
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take into account all types of fines imposed by those agencies.129 The State Controller stated that “poor collection efforts are not unique” to the three agencies,
but are a “systemic problem that plagues the State.”130 Thus, in California alone,
the total of uncollected fines is likely well into the hundreds of millions if not
billions of dollars. And California, of course, is just one of fifty states that collect
administrative fines.131
2. Agency-Specific Data
Consistent with these overall estimates, collection rates for particular agencies are typically well below 50%. Some examples:
• DOJ’s collection rate for federal criminal cases hovered around 4%
from 2000-2002.132
• The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) had, at best, a 5% collection rate
from 1986-1988 and 1997-2000.133
• The California Highway Patrol (CHP) collection rate for DUI-related
fines and penalties was 6.4% for 2006-2007 and 6.7% for 2007-2008.134
• The California Department of Industrial Relations’ (CDIR) annual
collection rate for worker wage-related fines was 24.7% from 2004 to
2006.135 The collection rate for worker safety-related fines was much
lower, ranging from 2.4% to 7.4% for the same period.136

129.

Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that audit focused only on DUI
penalties); Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 1 (discussing penalties imposed
through the California Department of Industrial Relations’ Department of Labor
Standards and Enforcement).

130.

SCO Press Release, supra note 40.

131.

The available data shows substantial uncollected penalty and fine balances in other locales as well. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 40 (noting $3 million in outstanding
uncollected fines in Norfolk, Virginia); Pennsylvania Fines Report, supra note 40
(noting $14 million in Pennsylvania fines outstanding). In 2002, outstanding debt
in Oregon (including fine debt) was $1.2 billion, yet the state collected only $200
million. Sec’y of State, Audit Report No. 2004-24, Debt Collections:
Progress Made but Opportunities for Improvement Still Exist 2 (2004)
[hereinafter Oregon Audit].

132.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 7.

133.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 9.

134.

Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 11 (noting approximately $270,000 collected from $4.27 million imposed in FY 2006-07 and approximately $360,000
collected from $5.35 million in FY 2007-08).

135.

Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 15.

136.

Id. at 10.
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• Customs collected approximately 31%, after certain adjustments, of
outstanding penalty debt for 1997-2000.137
• Although data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) was sufficiently unreliable that an accurate collection rate was
incalculable, only 30% of outstanding penalty debt had been collected
for at least three years.138
• The SEC collected approximately 40% of its outstanding fine debt from
1997-2002139 and 49% of its outstanding fine and disgorgement debt
from 2003-2004.140
• The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) collected
approximately 45% of outstanding fine debt from 1997-2002141 and approximately 34% of its outstanding fine and disgorgement debt from
2002-2004.142
3. Data Inflation
Even these dismal collections figures are likely overstated. As described
below: (1) the data do not always reflect the total amount of debt outstanding;
(2) some of these figures exclude improperly written-off debts from total debt,
inflating collection rates; (3) some of the data reflect periods when a high
percentage of total debt was unusually easy to collect; (4) collection rates in
some instances are trending downward; and (5) agencies’ data-tracking difficulties lead to overstated collection rates.
First, except for DOJ’s rates, the collection rates cited above represent
amounts collected in a given time frame divided by the amounts levied in that
same period; they do not describe the amount collected as a percentage of the
total amount outstanding—an important measure of collections effectiveness.
When outstanding balances are incorporated back into the equation, total col-

137.

GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 10.

138.

GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 2, 13 (failing to collect $172 million of $260
million). The GAO reviewed the CMS’ long-term care cases in which civil monetary penalties were imposed and settlement data for fiscal years 1999 and 2000.
However, the GAO determined that the $172 million in debt as of fiscal year 2000
remained outstanding from fiscal year 1997.

139.

GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003, supra note 14, at 21 tbl.1 (collecting approximately
$190 million of $480 million of open and closed cases).

140. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 23-24 (collecting approximately $2.8
billion of $5.6 billion).
141.

GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003, supra note 14, at 21 tbl.1 (collecting approximately
$161 million of $358 million of open and closed cases).

142.

GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 42 (collecting $210 million of $458
million).
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lection rates plummet. For example, the OSM’s initially-calculated 5% collection
rate drops to a mere 1%.143
Second, agencies sometimes improperly “write off” collectible fine debt144
or fail to properly record unpaid fines as accounts receivable.145 Such actions
lower the agency’s outstanding debt balance and simultaneously boost the
agency’s apparent collection rate.146 For example, the Customs’ 31% collection
rate reflected write-offs of nearly 90% of assessments from 1997-2000.147 Factoring those write-off amounts back in reduces the collection rate to less than
3%.148 At the CMS, there is an established policy limiting agents’ authority to
settle civil fines and penalties beyond a 35% discount.149 In over 40% of cases,
however, the Agency exceeded its own threshold—and in fact more than
doubled it, discounting cases by an average of 73%.150 This reduced potential
collections by millions.151 As we discuss below, although it is possible that CMS
is settling (albeit beyond their authority) for legitimate post-assessment reasons,
because of their failure to document their reasoning,152 one is only left to speculate whether the reductions are settlements or disguised write-offs.
Third, some of the fine collection rates cited above may be abnormally
high. For example, according to the SEC, its 49% collection rate for the 20032004 period was significantly higher than usual because the SEC happened at
the time to be collecting primarily from large, well-financed entities, like
mutual funds, that posed little challenge to recovery.153
Fourth, for some of these agencies collection rates are declining. The average collection rate for federal criminal cases was 7% from 1995-1999; decreased
to an average of 4% from 2000-2002;154 and fell even further to 3.3% for 2006.155
143.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 8-9.

144.

Dep’t of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2006 Report to the Congress: U.S.
Government Receivables and Debt Collection Activities Of Federal
Agencies 10 (2007); Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 8; see also Chiang,
DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 12 (noting that a deputy unilaterally cut in half a
citation and never reported reduction); GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 13.

145.

Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 8; see supra notes 92-97.

146. See, e.g., Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 1, 8, 11; Chiang, DIR Audit, supra
note 99, at 1, 10, 12.
147.

GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 9.

148.

Id.

149. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 3, 13-14.
150.

Id. at 13.

151.

Id. at 13-14.

152.

Id. at 3, 13-14.

153.

GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 23.

154.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 7.
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In fact, the decrease from 2000 to 2002 was not merely the result of DOJ collecting a smaller portion of an increased assessment of fines; the absolute amount
collected decreased.156 Likewise, collection rates for the CFTC and the OSM
dropped or remained static at best.157
Finally, agencies’ problems tracking their own fine-related data can lead to
understated fine receivables and consequently overstated collection rates. For
example, approximately $126 million in fines imposed by the California Public
Utilities Commission over an eight-year period were never entered into the
Agency’s accounting records.158 Its records also indicated that other fines had
been paid in full, when in fact they had not.159 Likewise, the CDIR failed to
record as much as $72 million in fines as accounts receivables over a three-year
period.160 The EPA also failed to record millions of dollars in disputed penalties.161 The absence of adequate controls in agencies’ data tracking systems was
found to pose a “high risk that fines or penalties may have been intentionally or
inadvertently excluded from the department’s records.”162
III. Undercollection: An Undesirable Problem Caused by Agencies
In this Part, we ask whether low collection rates are problematic and
within agencies’ control. If they are, then agencies are systematically
“undercollecting.” First, we examine several arguments that low collection rates
may be desirable, and find them lacking. Second, we analyze whether low collections are as a practical matter beyond agencies’ control, and find that they are
not. We find that low collection rates indicate undercollection rather than optimal and pragmatic policy.

155.

Todd, supra note 104.

156.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 7.

157.

GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 8-9; GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80,
at 43-44; GAO, SEC and CFTC 2003, supra note 14, at 21. The counter-argument
that collection rates are artificially depressed because they fail to take into account
what percentage of fine debt is actually collectible is taken up in Part III.

158.

Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at 2.

159.

Id. at 10.

160. Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 1, 10; see also Chiang, CHP Audit, supra
note 15, at 7 (indicating that CHP improperly classified DUI cost recovery billings,
understating account balances by millions of dollars).
161.

EPA, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report No. 10-P-0077, EPA Needs
To Improve Its Recording and Reporting of Fines and Penalties 4 (2010)
[hereinafter EPA, OIG Audit 2010].

162.

Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 10.
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A. Low Collection Rates Are Undesirable
Government auditors163 and many agencies ostensibly agree164 that noncollection of fines does not promote deterrence, punishment, compensation, or
revenue generation. Despite the apparent consensus favoring collection, some
agencies may eschew collections to promote compliance instead, or because the
agencies initially levy unreasonably high fees. Ultimately, we conclude that these
are not compelling justifications for deliberately failing to collect fines, both
because of the risk of unintended consequences among regulated entities and
the public, and because a policy of non-collection creates skewed incentives
within agencies.
1. Trade-Offs Between Collecting Fines and Inducing Compliance
Some agencies dispute that improving collection rates is an important, or
even advisable, goal. The EPA, for example, routinely “assesses” large fines or
penalties against firms that have violated its rules or regulations, but then
waives or significantly reduces the assessments if the violators agree to bring
their operations into compliance going forward.165

163.

See, e.g., GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 67 (“[A]gencies are to (1)
service and collect debts in a manner that best protects the value of the federal
government’s assets and (2) provide accounting and management information for
effective stewardship, including resources entrusted to the government.”); EPA,
OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 17 (“[B]illings and collections . . . serve as a deterrent to noncompliance with environmental statutes.”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-01-900, SEC and CFTC: Most Fines Collected, but
Improvements Needed in the Use of Treasury’s Collection Service 1
(2001) [hereinafter GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001] (“Levying fines is an important
mechanism that regulators use to sanction those who violate . . . industry rules.
However, for fines to be an effective means of ensuring adherence with the rules,
regulators must collect them.”); SCO Press Release, supra note 40 (stating that
agencies’ failure to collect fines leaves “taxpayers to pick up the tab” for “unscrupulous businesses and employers,” and “ultimately shortchang[es] the State’s
General Fund”).

164. See, e.g., GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 27; GAO, SEC and CFTC
2001, supra note 163, at 33.
165.

Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 104. The EPA is by no means the only agency to
routinely waive penalties. See, e.g., GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 11. When
confronted with dismal fine collection rates, the OSM argued that, although collecting fines is an “important objective, maximizing revenue from [civil fine and
penalty] collections is less important to management than achieving compliance
with mining laws.” The OSM reportedly routinely writes off or compromises fines
when it has met its enforcement objectives, citing to the fact that 72% of its
notices of violations were abated. Id. But a 72% violation abatement rate still does
not explain (let alone justify) a mere 1-5% fine collection rate. Id. at 8-9.
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Ostensibly, from the agency’s perspective, this trade-off between fine
collection and rule compliance achieves the greatest good. A firm changing its
behavior going forward is a definite ongoing long-term benefit, whereas a fine
provides a one-time, short-term revenue-raising or compensation benefit and
an unclear, longer-term deterrence benefit. Moreover, it may be difficult to
calibrate a fine to achieve optimal deterrence, so getting a firm to change its
practices avoids the risk of both over- and under-deterring that firm. If fines are
designed to induce compliance, compliance-for-collection swaps simply eliminate an unnecessary intermediate step.
But the EPA’s willingness to forgo fine collections undermines revenue
generation and compensation (to the extent the latter is applicable), and also
may undermine deterrence. If regulated firms know that the EPA routinely fails
to collect fines, such firms will not take such fines seriously. If firms get caught,
they can simply make the adjustments to come into regulatory compliance that
they should have made all along. In the meantime, until they are caught, they
benefit from the advantages of non-compliance, and the public suffers the
harmful environmental effects.
The EPA has acknowledged that regulated firms’ knowledge of their low
collection rates could jeopardize deterrence.166 The Agency’s response: Do not
let them find out. The EPA publicly reports the amount of fines assessed, not
fines collected,167 and has repeatedly rejected auditors’ recommendations that
it make this distinction clear and separately report collections.168 It regards
“reporting of penalties assessed as being of greater deterrent value than reporting both assessed and collected penalties,”169 and has asserted that, while “penalties collected is a useful internal management measure, we do not believe that
penalties collected should be publicly reported.”170
Although there is a superficial appeal to this approach—better to let firms
believe that all assessed penalties are collected—it is naïve, because it assumes
that firms will not obtain information regarding collections if it is not publicly
reported. Firms, particularly those within an industry, communicate; and the
attorneys who represent them are repeat players who gain knowledge and
expertise regarding how an agency is likely to treat violators.171
This approach is also dangerous because it creates skewed incentives. If an
agency gets the public relations benefit of reporting large assessed fines without
actually collecting them, it will tend to chase the headlines and prioritize
166. GAO, EPA 2008, supra note 75, at 16.
167.

Id. at 3, 6.

168.

Id. at 15-16; EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 15-16.

169. GAO, EPA 2008, supra note 75, at 16.
170.

Id. (emphasis added); see EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 16.

171.

Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the Uneasy
Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 149
(1996).
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appearance over substantive accomplishment.172 The EPA has boasted increases
in assessed penalties, when in fact penalties collected from 1998 to 2007 (adjusted for inflation) were found to have decreased by 43%.173
Such exaggerated self-reporting also dupes the public into believing that the
agency is doing more than it is. This belief can create a false sense of trust in the
agency’s integrity and success, which could collapse when accurate figures come
to light.174 Further, without accurate information about the actual state of agency performance, taxpayers are in no position to demand a shift in agency priorities or improved performance. Congress may also be misled regarding the agency’s enforcement outcomes, resulting in inappropriate budgetary allocations
based on inaccurate information.175

172.

For example, the U.S. Department of Transportation assessed a $3.05 million penalty against the owner of a pipeline that killed three people during an explosion.
Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 104. The agency announced that the fine was the
largest in the history of the federal pipeline safety program, and stated that the
large penalty was warranted because “[t]ragic events like this pipeline failure must
never happen again.” Id. But that penalty was ultimately reduced by 92%, to a
mere $250,000, without evidence of inability to pay more. Id.
Similarly, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) imposed a $1.2
million fine on San Diego Gas and Electric, and the Commission’s records indicated it had collected 100% of the fine. Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at 10.
However, CPUC had in fact waived the fine altogether and agreed that the utilities
company could instead pay $200,000 for an education program that the company
would administer. Ultimately, there was no evidence showing how or when the
company spent any amount on education. Id.

173.

GAO, EPA 2008, supra note 75, at 3 (reporting a decrease in collections from
$240.6 million to $137.7 million). The EPA would likely counter that the lost deterrence from decreased fine collection was more than outweighed by the value of
injunctive relief obtained and reduced pollution achieved. But these figures are
likewise unreliable because they are based on estimates arrived at by the Agency’s
own staff (which are often derived from information provided by the violators
themselves, who have their own incentive to overstate the value of their compliance measures), rather than on results actually achieved, let alone audited. Id.
at 3-4, 9. Moreover, since the EPA reports both the estimated value of compliance
measures taken and the value of fines imposed, ostensible success in inducing
compliance cannot justify overstating the impact of the Agency’s fining activity.
The specific ways the EPA determines when to forgo collections raise a host of
issues, a full analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Article.

174.

See EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 16; James O. Freedman, Crisis and
Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government 10
(1978) (“Institutional legitimacy is an indispensable condition for institutional
effectiveness.”).

175.

EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 16.
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2. Unreasonably High Assessments, Not Low Collections
Some agencies have assessed the maximum fine allowed by law and subsequently mitigate the fine according to the circumstances of each case.176 Such a
practice can give an agency strategic bargaining leverage, allowing the agency to
induce the offender to stipulate to pay more (and pay more quickly) than it
otherwise would have. If assessed fine amounts are artificially high, then an
agency that waives or lowers the fine in order to extract concessions from a regulated firm arguably has not lost anything at all. It is only undercollecting in
relation to an unrealistic figure.
But a policy of over-assessment has potential drawbacks. Some firms may
pay the assessed amount in full, leading to overdeterrence.177 The prospect of
excessive fines may also increase transaction costs and needlessly complicate
settlement prospects by inducing offenders to hire an attorney or prepare a vigorous or elaborate defense.178
In any event, agencies often fail to document why fines are reduced subsequent to initial assessment, making it difficult to determine if over-assessment
explains low collection rates.179 Agencies also routinely neglect to follow their
own guidelines for reducing penalties, suggesting that they are not engaging in a
structured or calibrated assessment and mitigation process.180 Further, if overassessment were a significant explanatory factor in low collections, one would
expect agencies to invoke it in response to government audits criticizing collections performance. However, in the dozen GAO audits in which agencies responded to GAO’s collections-related findings, no agency relied on this rationale.
We conclude that deliberately abdicating collections risks undermining the
core purposes of fines. At the same time, our findings belie any strategic overassessment of fines by agencies that would favorably explain low collection
rates. Thus, the evidence does not show that failing to collect assessed fines is
desirable.
B. Low Collection Rates Are Caused by Factors Within Agencies’ Control
If fines are not fully collected because of factors out of agencies’ control—
such as offenders’ inability to pay—then we cannot expect collection rates to
improve, nor blame agencies for failing to collect more. In such circumstances,
low collection rates would not indicate undercollection. In this Section we
conclude that while factors outside of agencies’ control substantially contribute
176.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1481.

177.

Id. at 1483.

178.

Id.

179.

See infra text accompanying note 195.

180. See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 13-14.
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to less-than-perfect collection rates, agencies nevertheless leave billions of dollars in potentially collectible fines on the table.
1. External Obstacles to Fine Collections
Even when agency personnel are acting diligently and competently, offenders may lack means to pay the fine;181 alternatively, the offenders may hide or
dissipate their assets. Inability to pay has been a particularly vexing issue in the
criminal context because the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 mandates that restitution be imposed in a wide variety of federal criminal cases,
without regard to the offender’s ability to pay.182 Approximately 70% of DOJ’s
outstanding criminal debt balance consists of nonfederal restitution (owed to
parties other than the federal government),183 much of which may be uncollectible because restitution was ordered without regard to the offenders’ means.184
There are also restrictions on writing off such debt.185 Thus, although DOJ has
collected as little as 4% of outstanding criminal debt in recent years,186 this may
not reflect the percentage of collectible debt that has been recovered.187
Uncollectibility has also been blamed for low collection rates of civil
fines.188 But the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act does not apply to federal civil fines (or to any state or local fines), and so most agencies are not obligated to
impose fines without regard to ability to pay. To the contrary, many agencies—
including the very agencies whose audits have revealed a substantial failure to
collect fine amounts assessed—are explicitly directed to consider the offender’s
ability to pay in setting the initial fine amount.189 Nevertheless, it is possible that
these agencies, appropriately or not, are considering ability to pay after imposition of the fine, but before collection, through the mitigation process. Or agen-

181.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 10.

182.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006).

183.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 2-3.

184.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 35.

185.

Id. at 32; see 18 U.S.C. § 3613.

186.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 3, 27.

187.

See GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 10.

188.

See, e.g., GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 67; see also Chiang, CHP Audit, supra
note 15, at 4 attach. A.

189.

Diver, supra note 1, at 1441; see 12 U.S.C. § 4585(c)(2) (2006) (requiring that ability
to pay be considered in determining size of the penalty); 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(C)
(2006) (same); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(d) (same); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(5)(B) (2006) (same); Gimbel v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 872 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. New-Form
Mfg. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1327-28 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003) (same); 19 C.F.R.
§ 171, App. B(E)(b)(ii) (2010) (same); 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(f) (2010) (CMS) (same).
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cies may be mitigating fines not because offenders lack means, but because the
agencies have made a determination that the benefits of pursuing collection are
outweighed by the costs of collection and the risk that collection efforts will
ultimately be unsuccessful.190 If so, then a comparison of assessed fines to
collected fines would be misleading, as it would fail to reflect the amounts the
agency realistically expects to collect.
These claimed excuses are inadequate to explain agencies’ poor collections
performance. First, agencies have more or less consistently failed to undertake a
meaningful analysis of what portion of outstanding fine debt is collectible191
(even when required to do so192) and so have made it difficult to assess what
portion of collectible debt is actually being recovered.193 In 1999, for example,
DOJ placed nearly $10 billion in criminal debt in “suspense,” without formally
assessing the prospects for collectability.194
Second, agencies often fail to adequately document fine mitigations or the
reasons therefor—be they the strategic maneuvers discussed above, or concessions to uncollectability—and so they make it difficult to confirm whether such
mitigations account for the discrepancies between assessments and collection.195
190. Diver, supra note 1, at 1471. We distinguish eschewing collections to avoid collection costs or risks that judgment enforcement techniques will be unsuccessful,
from discounting a fine based on the risk that an assessment would not be judicially upheld because liability itself is questionable. The latter type of discount
may be perfectly rational and legitimate; but there is little documentation of its
occurrence.
191.

GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 2, 10-13 (noting that the CMS failed to conduct
“individual account analysis” of “debtor’s ability to pay”); GAO, OSM 2001, supra
note 13, at 8, 13 (finding that although the OSM claimed that its historically poor
collections rate was due largely to the fact that violators routinely went bankrupt
or were financially not viable, in every audited case in which the OSM had agreed
to an installment plan, the Agency lacked documentation demonstrating that the
offender was unable to pay the fine immediately); GAO, Criminal Debt 2004,
supra note 12, at 12; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 67-68
(“[N]either [the courts nor DOJ] perform[ed] an analysis of criminal debts to estimate how much of the outstanding amounts are uncollectible.”); GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 22 (concluding that Customs relied on a deficient
collectibility analysis); see also Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 10 (noting
that a state agency required to prepare cost-benefit analyses of collections options—in all cases where initial efforts failed—never did so).

192.

See, e.g., Chiang, CHP Audit, supra note 15, at 10; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001,
supra note 64, at 67-68 (“Unless FLUs or the courts assess the collectibility of this
debt, set expectations as to the amount of debt that can be collected, and compare
expectations against actual collections, management cannot effectively monitor
program performance in debt collection.”).

193.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 74-75.

194. Id. at 67-68.
195.
484

Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 10.
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Third, to the extent that collectability estimates exist, they suggest that
agencies are doing a dismal job with collections. For example, estimates of the
portion of the federal criminal debt balance that is collectible range from about
10 to 33% of the total.196 Although this suggests that the lion’s share of criminal
debt is not collectible, it also indicates that, with a 4% collection rate, DOJ is still
collecting only about 12 to 40% of collectible criminal debt.197
The limited data regarding mitigations is similarly inculpatory. For example, Customs initially assessed the maximum fine authorized by law as a matter
of course, and explicitly considered cost and difficulty of collecting fines and the
offender’s inability to pay in determining whether to adjust the initial assessment.198 Thus, offender-based obstacles to collection were already taken into
account when comparing the post-mitigation fines to the amounts collected.
From fiscal years 1997 to 2000, Customs adjusted its assessed fines from $9.3
billion down to $900 million. But it still collected only $257 million, less than a
third of the adjusted amount.199 There are also instances of regulators reducing
fines assessed against extremely well-funded corporations by 80 to 90%—even
when the violations were egregious and caused substantial injuries.200
Fourth, mitigating fines on the ground that it reduces costs is problematic.
Contesting fines creates roughly symmetrical costs for offenders and the agency;
such costs encourage offenders to settle sooner or for a higher amount than
they otherwise would have in a cost-free world. Therefore, “[A]n agency sensitive to the realities of bargaining position should . . . exercise restraint in its
willingness to discount its demand by a factor representing litigation savings,”
196. Melson Testimony, supra note 123, at 34 (noting that an independent contractor
hired by the Executive Office for United States Attorneys estimated that 10% of
debt was collectible); GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 26 n.3 (noting
that outside investigators estimated that 33% of debt was collectible); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 97 (noting that DOJ has concluded that approximately 25% of debt is collectible).
197.

See also Melson Testimony, supra note 123, at 6 (noting the Executive Office for
United States Attorneys conceding that only about one-third of collectible debt is
recovered); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 97 (also estimating onethird of collectible debt being recovered).

198.

GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 9, 11-12.

199. Id. at 10; see also GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 8-9 (noting that after adjusting
receivables to take into account write-offs and very old debts, the OSM’s collection rate improved only slightly, from 1-3% up to about 5%).
200. Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at 10 (reducing by 83% a fine against San
Diego Gas & Electric); Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 104 (noting that a pipeline
fine related to a pipeline rupture in Bellingham, Washington resulting in multiple
deaths was reduced by 92%, from $3.05 million to $250,000); see also Nat’l
Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB/PAR-02/02, Pipeline Accident Report: Pipeline
Rupture and Subsequent Fire in Bellingham, Washington 1 (2002), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/PAR0202.pdf (discussing the Bellingham pipeline rupture in more detail).
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because the offender should be willing to increase its offered payment by a similar amount.201 Moreover, although forgoing fine collection does reduce costs,
doing so also undermines deterrence. The general deterrence benefits of
pursuing fines may justify the cost of more vigorous collections efforts, even if
collection costs may approach or exceed the fine collected in a given instance.202
Fifth, uncollectability is generally less of a concern with white-collar and
corporate offenders than it is with individuals engaged in “street crime.”203
Granted, white-collar offenders are more likely to generate massive financial
losses that would be impossible to pay back in full (take Bernard Madoff, for
example204). But they are more likely to have significant future income streams,
and so long-term garnishment could provide a realistic means of providing
meaningful recovery for many victims, even after serving a prison sentence.
Indeed, one federal audit showed that only 7% of ordered restitution had
been collected from selected white-collar offenders, despite evidence that they
had significant wealth streams and continued to live very comfortably postconviction.205 As the GAO concluded: “Taking into account the factors that are
not controllable, the present management practices and processes do not
provide assurance that offenders are not afforded their ill-gotten gains and that
innocent victims are compensated for their losses to the fullest extent possible.”206 Billions in collectible sums are thus left on the table.207

201. Diver, supra note 1, at 1471-72.
202. Cf. Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences Under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 261, 266 (1993) (“[T]here may be unusual
judicial administration costs associated with these innovative sanctions. However,
these appear to be costs that Congress intended sentencing courts and convicted
firms to bear in the interest of reducing corporate crime and preventing repeat
offenses.”).
203. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/T-GGD-94-178, Restitution, Fines, and
Forfeiture: Issues for Further Review and Oversight 13 (1994) (statement
by Henry R. Wray, Director of Administration of Justice Issues) [hereinafter
GAO, Wray Statement]; see GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 46.
204. See, e.g., Madoff Gets 150 Years for Fraud, CBC News (June 29, 2009,
2:23
PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/06/29/madoff-ponzi-fraud
-sentence564.html (“Madoff was ordered to forfeit $170 billion in connection with
his massive Ponzi scheme.”). Actual losses were likely below that, but still well into the billions. Id. (noting that “1,341 accounts opened since December 1995 alone
suffered losses of $13.2 billion”); Ian Katz and Jesse Westbrook, Madoff Trustee
Finds $830 Million of Liquid Assets (Update2), Bloomberg, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVJ.rD9jZOwQ
(estimating $37 billion in losses). But Madoff’s recoverable assets have been
estimated at less than $1 billion. Katz & Westbrook, supra (noting that the trustee
identified $830 million to $850 million in recoverable assets).
205. GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 4, 11.
206. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 11.
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2. Agency Failures Contributing to Undercollection
Certain agency deficiencies noted above, such as failing to timely and accurately enter fine data into data-tracking systems, failing to assess collectability,
or excessively writing off fines,208 not only hinder assessment of agencies’ performance of fine collection, but also impair agencies’ ability to collect fines.209
Other agency failures also impair collections, as summarized below.
Inadequate Asset Discovery. Although the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual provides
that FLUs should “promptly and vigorously” perform asset discovery work, little or no asset discovery work was done at all in 66% of cases, including 48% of
210
“high-dollar cases.” Lack of prompt asset discovery buys offenders time to
hide or liquidate assets, and prevents agencies from effectively prioritizing col211
lections cases.
Officials from the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices stated that asset discovery work is
performed “only if the FLU believes, based on its judgment, that the offender

207. The federal criminal debt balance in 2006 was $46 billion. Melson Testimony,
supra note 123, at 2. Between half and three quarters of this total, or $23 to $34
billion, relates to corporate and/or white-collar crime. GAO, Wray Statement,
supra note 203, at 8-9 (according to figures from DOJ, approximately 50% of thenoutstanding criminal debt was attributable to offenders in financial fraud cases);
see id. According to analysis by the GAO, approximately 75% of the 50 largest
criminal debts were owed by offenders convicted of financial fraud. If 10-33% of
this white-collar crime total is collectible, see supra note 196 and accompanying
text, then roughly $2.3 to $11 billion could be collected. Yet DOJ typically collects
$1 billion per year or less in total criminal debt. GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra
note 12, at 7-8.
A further possibility is that the amounts currently collected are low only because many offenders are in the middle of installment plans which, when completed, will yield substantially higher collections. But again, there is little evidence
of this, and agencies are not invoking this explanation in response to audits.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 107-113, 144-151, 158-162.
209. See GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 2; EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at
4; EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 14 (finding that, although unauthorized write-offs may be in the agency’s best interest in particular cases, the lack of
oversight regarding routine deviations from stated policy undermines confidence
that the purposes behind imposing the fines and penalties in the first place are being furthered).
210. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 14, 45. “High-dollar cases” are
defined as those in which the criminal debt is “greater than or equal to $14 million
at the four federal judicial districts with the largest amount of outstanding criminal debt.” Id. at 8.
211.

Id. at 45.
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may have assets.”212 Such assessments make little sense because discovery is
often aimed at discovering hidden assets, which an FLU is unlikely to know
about pre-discovery. Moreover, the FLUs were not required to document the
reasons justifying the “judgment” to forgo such work in individual cases.213 The
GAO concluded that the FLU’s practice of relying solely on the offender’s
description of available assets—without independent verification—jeopardized
effective collections.214
Civil fine collections similarly suffer from inadequate asset discovery.
Customs did not require offenders who claimed an inability to pay to provide
any audited financial statements or other independent audit reports to corroborate their claims.215 The GAO cited six fines totaling $28.7 million that were
reduced to a total of $1.5 million, based in whole or in part on offenders’
claimed inability to pay.216 Even after these drastic reductions, Customs collected only $108,000, or about 7% of the total.217
Under-Utilization of Available Collections Mechanisms. Not surprisingly, the
GAO found that “the likelihood of recovering amounts owed decreases dramatically with the age of delinquency.”218 Nevertheless, collections personnel have
routinely failed to utilize collection methods in a timely manner or at all.219
A 1985 audit found that U.S. Attorneys and federal probation officers used
garnishment in zero out of 635 cases reviewed, even though income was
available in 20 to 90% of cases.220 Two decades later, GAO estimates that they

212.

Id.

213.

Id.

214.

See id. at 45-46 (citing, as an example, a white-collar offender who had paid only
$750 of a $344,000 restitution order; the FLU did not even begin to conduct an
asset investigation until six years later—and even then only began investigating
once it learned that the offender’s case would be included in the GAO audit).

215.

GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 21.

216.

Id. at 22.

217.

Id.

218.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 41; see Oregon Audit, supra note
131, at 3.

219.

Administrative agencies have access to a wide variety of collection tools, including: conducting asset searches; filing liens on offender assets to prevent asset
transfers; sending delinquency notices and demand letters; reviewing open cases
to reassess offenders’ ability to pay; establishing installment plans for debt payments; and in some situations referring collections to specialized collections units.
See supra Subsection I.B.3.

220. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/GGD-86-02, After the Criminal
Fine Enforcement Act of 1984—Some Issues Still Need To Be Resolved 34
(1985) [hereinafter GAO, Criminal Fines 1985].
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still failed to file liens to prevent the transfer of assets in 30% of cases;221 and
when they did file them, the average delay between entry of judgment and lien
filing was 639 days.222 The GAO concluded that deficiencies regarding lien filing
contributed to inadequate collections.223 When confronted with their failure to
pursue available enforcement techniques,224 U.S. Attorneys’ Office representatives asserted that such techniques “are not pursued until the FLU determines
that an offender has assets or sufficient earnings and is willfully not paying
amounts owed.”225 But this, again, was circular logic, as the FLUs performed
limited asset discovery work in the first place.226
DOJ, as well as other federal and state agencies, also neglected or delayed
collections in a variety of other ways,227 including: failing to use secured promissory notes to ensure debt payment, even when the Agency’s own audit division
had identified assets to back the notes;228 failing to send delinquency notices in
the majority of cases;229 failing to review open cases annually to reassess the
offender’s ability to pay;230 failing to properly establish installment plans231 or
monitor installment plans when established;232 failing to consistently assess and
pursue interest and penalties on delinquent debt;233 allowing the statute of limitations to expire on collections efforts;234 neglecting to file judgments within a
221.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 13.

222. Id. at 44.
223. GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 10 n.14.
224. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 4 (describing agencies’ failure to
use seizure of property, court summons, or contempt of court citations as
enforcement techniques); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 33 (noting that although laws authorized pre-conviction seizure of assets, FLUs were not
pursuing liquidation of assets until after an offender was sentenced).
225. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 47.
226. Id.
227. See generally id. at 42; EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 5.
228. GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 17.
229. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 50.
230. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 39; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001,
supra note 64, at 50.
231.

GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 37; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001,
supra note 64, at 56.

232. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 12-13; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note
64, at 58-59.
233.

GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 4; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra
note 64, at 50-51.

234. Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 8; GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at
23-25 (noting that the Agency failed to timely request an extension of a statute of
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one-year period;235 delaying more than a year before referring collections to
specialized collection units;236 and delaying an average of nearly two years in
sending demand letters to offenders.237 These defects diminished offenders’
incentives to make prompt payments,238 and led to the failure to collect available funds.239
Agencies responsible for collections often complain that legal obstacles—
such as limitations on pre-judgment restraint of assets,240 laws shielding assets
from seizure,241 the automatic stay that protects offenders who file for bankruptcy,242 or even unfavorable rulings by judges243—make it difficult to quickly
and effectively collect fines.244 But agencies often fail to utilize legal tools already
at their disposal,245 so it is unlikely that giving them bigger or better tools will do
much to solve the problem.

limitation, resulting in mitigation or writing off of tens of millions of dollars in
fines).
235.

Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 8.

236. Id. at 9.
237.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 49-50.

238. GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 4; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra
note 64, at 50; see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 Geo.
L.J. 949, 954 (2003) (“[A] delay between violation and punishment can dramatically reduce the perceived cost of the violation.”).
239. See, e.g., GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 51, 58-59.
240. GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 12-13.
241.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 10, 39; see GAO, Criminal Fines
1985, supra note 220, at 36.

242. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006); Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 85, at 1; GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 14.
243. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 60 (citing instances in which judges
rejected recommendations by probation officers that offenders not be released
from probation based on nonpayment of criminal debt in accordance with an
established installment schedule).
244. Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at 1, 7-8; Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note
99, at 8; GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 12, 14-15.
245. See, e.g., Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at 1 (finding that offender-based
collections obstacles were compounded by numerous “processing shortcomings
and control deficiencies”); id. at 2 (“We noted many cases in which the CPUC apparently made no effort to collect, even after it had obtained court judgments at
considerable effort and expense.”); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at
54-55 (observing that while FLUs complained of offenders’ lack of cooperation in
disclosing their assets, agency officials had legal means—and obligation—to
determine ability to pay through other avenues).
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Inefficient Administrative Organization. Sometimes mismanagement causes
collections problems. For example, the GAO noted in 2009 that the SEC’s newly
created Office of Collections and Distributions (OCD)—which was intended to
streamline and improve collections—utilized an inefficient and ineffective dual
reporting structure.246 The OCD director reported to the SEC’s executive director, who reported to the SEC Chairman. But the OCD’s deputy director—to
whom all but two OCD staff ultimately reported—had a direct report relationship to both the OCD director and the SEC’s Director of Enforcement; the
SEC’s Director of Enforcement meanwhile has no formal link to the OCD
director. Thus, most staff ostensibly within the OCD were, for practical purposes, in the organizational structure of a different division. All parties involved
reported that this dual structure hampered efficient utilization of resources and
led to delays and confusion about who was responsible for what duties.247
Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination. Poor cooperation and
coordination between agencies also contributes to undercollection. For example, although federal law mandates that federal agencies refer certain delinquent
debts to Treasury’s Financial Management Services to pursue collection,
the GAO found that multiple agencies had policies that were inadequate to
ensure timely referrals.248 Even once referrals occurred, when Financial Management Services and the violator reached a proposed compromise, agencies
would sometimes fail to review and approve the compromise in a timely
manner—delaying nearly a year, in some instances—by which point the violator’s assets had been diminished or diverted, and they were no longer able or
willing to pay the agreed-upon amount.249 As commentators have noted, such
lack of coordination exacerbates low collections by administrative agencies.250
Perhaps the best illustration of the failure of agencies to coordinate their
efforts is the decades-long attempt to centralize the collection of federal criminal fines. A 1984 GAO audit recommended, among other things, increased
cooperation and sharing of information among DOJ and the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC), which share responsibility for
246. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-358, Securities and Exchange
Commission: Greater Attention Needed to Enhance Communication and
Utilization of Resources in the Division of Enforcement 15 (2009).
247. Id. at 16.
248. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 15; GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163,
at 3, 25.
249. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 20, 22.
250. Mona Lewandoski, Barred from Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors In and
Outside Bankruptcy, 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 191, 248 n.360 (2010)
(“Debts often remain unpaid at least partly because staff working for distinct
agencies do not have clear guidelines as to how their collection efforts should be
prioritized. . . . There is little coordination among agencies responsible for collecting various debts . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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recording and collecting federal criminal debt.251 DOJ claimed that it was
already in the process of working with the AOUSC to establish a centralized
system for reporting, tracking, and accounting for all court-imposed criminal
fines.252 By the following year, the planned system was still “not yet operational,”253 and eventually that plan was scrapped in favor of development of a
“National Fine Center” (NFC), intended to centralize federal criminal fine
collections and record-keeping.
Development of the NFC began in 1990,254 and it was originally supposed to
be operational nationwide by early 1995.255 In 1994, the AOUSC (to which
primary responsibility for accounting for and processing criminal debt had
been transferred in 1987256) acknowledged that “the NFC project proved to be
much larger, more complex, and more difficult than originally expected.”257 The
new target date for completion of the NFC was late 1996.258 By mid-1996, however, it was apparent that the NFC was not going to materialize, and efforts at
centralization were terminated that year.259
Among the reasons for the delays in the centralization effort was an inability to efficiently reconcile the various agencies’ records, because “judicial district
and U.S. Attorney staffs had difficulty agreeing on account balances”—
notwithstanding protocols to minimize those differences.260 At congressional
hearings, testimony revealed inter-departmental bickering and consequent lack
of adequate planning261 to accomplish a task that could have been completed
months or years earlier, and for far less, if conducted by private enterprises.262

251.

GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 21, 28-29; see supra text accompanying notes 64-75.

252. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 23. The purported plan of centralization was concededly “not as complete” as the GAO recommended. Id. at 30.
253.

Id. at 30.

254. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 9.
255.

GAO, Wray Statement, supra note 203, at 14.

256. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 9.
257.

GAO, Wray Statement, supra note 203, at 15.

258. Id.
259. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 11.
260. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/AIMD-95-76, National Fine Center: Progress Made but Challenges Remain for Criminal Debt System 10
(1995) [hereinafter GAO, National Fine Center 1995].
261.

492

For example, there were no collection specialists slated to staff the new fine center.
Criminal Debt Collection Efforts: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Govt’l Affairs,
104th Cong. 1, 35 (1995) (Testimony of Michael A. Insco, President, Margate Systems, Inc.) [hereinafter 1995 Senate Hearing].
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Unfortunately, the GAO observed that “enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal debt collection hinges on these entities working together.”263
To make matters worse, the Office of Management and Budget and the
Treasury Department—which play central oversight roles in financial reporting
and debt management, respectively264—have routinely refused to take a leading
role in collections,265 notwithstanding the GAO’s conclusion that such oversight
is needed.266
Failure to Heed Auditors’ Recommendations. Agencies responsible for collections not only failed to work with each other, they also failed to implement

262. See, e.g., id. at 10 (“[T]here appears to be a communications problem between the
Department of Justice and AO[USC].”); id. at 21 (stating that the AOUSC claimed
that “the Department of Justice has been, while helpful in some ways, challenging
in other ways . . . .”); id. at 22 (statement of Sen. McCain) (“[W]e should not have
to be ventilating these differences in a Congressional hearing.”); id. at 31 (testimony of M. Kenneth Bien of Andersen Consulting) (“[I]t is possible to put in place
an effective nationwide collection system for criminal debts within 18 months for
$15 million, more than $10 million than the current estimates for a system. When
the Criminal Fines Improvement Act was passed in 1987, the intentions of the U.S.
Congress were noble, but good intentions also require good strategy, good planning, and good implementation. We are here today because, 8 years later, we are
still awaiting the system that fulfills the good intentions of Congress.”); id. at 34
(testimony of Insco) (“[T]he National Fine Center is no closer today to being a
reality than it was 10 years ago. I also indicate to you that I believe that victims
have made a very, very poor investment of their money in a system that has only
cost them money and, in fact, has not returned anything to them.”); id. at 36 (testimony of Insco) (“I do not believe that they [DOJ and AOUSC] can solve this
problem if they do not understand the problem.”).
263. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 60. When agencies do work together, collections have been found to improve. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra
note 163, at 11 (noting that the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
saw its collection rate improve dramatically after it initiated a program to obtain
SEC assistance in obtaining court orders directing violators to pay outstanding
NASD fines); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 68 (“During our
reviews, we found that prior to [the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996],
the FLUs referred certain debts to the former Tax Refund Offset Program and
were successful in collecting payments.”).
264. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 3, 14-15; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note
64, at 11, 16.
265. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 14; GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 15; GAO,
Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 29.
266. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 66; id. at 70 (“Without additional
high-level oversight and cooperation between the entities, criminal debt collection
is likely to remain ineffective. Further, the assessment of criminal fines and restitution as an effective punitive tool may be in jeopardy.”).
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proposals suggested by internal and outside auditors.267 In the majority of
situations, these agencies have not disputed the desirability of pursuing their
auditors’ proposals, despite opportunities to object.268 However, as described
below, they have nevertheless neglected to follow many of these recommendations.
The agencies responsible for collecting criminal debt, for example, have
been intransigent with regard to a variety of issues.269 In 2001, after the collapse
of the NFC centralization project, the GAO’s principal fall-back recommendation was that DOJ and AOUSC, along with the Office of Management and
Budget and Treasury, should establish a task force to develop a strategic plan to
improve coordination and establish effective collections processes.270 But by
2004, the inter-agency collections task force had still not been formed, and the
GAO renewed its recommendation.271 The Agencies again did nothing, until
Congress directed them to form the task force as part of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2005.272 Even then, their report was submitted months
past the deadline, and indicated that the task force did only the bare minimum
to mollify Congress.273
DOJ and AOUSC failed to implement a number of other recommendations
years or even decades after they were first made,274 including failing to: consis267. See, e.g., Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 10 (noting that although the
CDIR’s failure to adequately track collections data was identified in a 1997 report,
the failure had not been remedied as of 2009).
268. See, e.g., GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 69 (noting that agency agreed with all
recommendations); GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that DOJ
commented on findings, but objected to no recommendations); GAO, Customs
2002, supra note 92, at 35-37 (noting that the Agency “concur[red]” with all recommendations); GAO, SEC 2007, supra note 92, at 37 (noting that the Agency
agreed with all recommendations).
269. This intransigence is not just disturbing, it is surprising. Mark Seidenfeld, Why
Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 Ohio
St. L.J. 251, 298 (2009) (“According to the psychology of accountability, the most
predictable reaction of agency decision makers to such outcome review will simply be to attempt to act in accordance with the preferences of its overseers.”).
270. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 70.
271.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 20-21; see Letter from Paul R. Corts,
Assistant Att’y Gen. for Admin. to Hon. Frank Wolf, Comm. on Appropriations
(Aug. 31, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter DOJ Task Force Letter].

272. See 2005 Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and related agencies, H.R. 4754, 108th Cong. (2004).
273.

DOJ Task Force Letter, supra note 271, at 2 (noting that the task force met in
full only twice in ten months, and made recommendations, but accomplished
little in terms of concrete changes).

274. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 46-47; GAO, Criminal Debt 2004,
supra note 12, at 5.
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tently assess and pursue interest and penalties on delinquent criminal debt;275
properly review suspended debts annually to reassess the offender’s ability to
pay;276 document instances of and reasons why assets discovery work was not
performed;277 and adequately share information.278 DOJ submitted its report
regarding its incomplete implementation of the GAO’s recommendations two
years past the deadline—and even then only after prodding by the GAO.279
This intransigence has not gone unnoticed. Commenting upon AOUSC’s
issuance of revised collections guidelines in light of its recommendations, the
GAO complained: “[U]nless probation officers effectively implement these
guidelines, such weaknesses will continue to exist.”280
In other instances in which agencies have expressly objected to their auditors’ recommendations, their responses reveal dismissive attitudes toward
collections. For example, when the EPA was criticized for publicly reporting
only penalties assessed and not penalties collected (a much lower figure), the
Agency responded that it believed it unnecessary to report the latter figure,
because “the billing and collection of penalties are not an enforcement function.”281 Other agencies have expressed similar views.282 If the agency does not

275.

GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 50-51 (noting that DOJ Office of
Inspector General made recommendation as early as 1993).

276. Compare GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 39 (making original
recommendations in 1985), with GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 48
(noting failures to annually reassess offenders’ abilities to pay throughout the
1990s).
277. GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that such documentation
was recommended in 2001).
278. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 11, 15; id. at 60 (“This lack of coordination is a long-standing problem that has not been adequately addressed. The
failure to adequately address this problem results in inefficient processes and
duplication of efforts.”).
279. GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12 at 10-11 (noting that agency heads are
typically required to submit report within 60 days); see 31 U.S.C. § 720(b) (2006).
280. GAO, Restitution 2005, supra note 2, at 18 (“[I]t is important that the policies
and procedures be effectively implemented once they are established.”); GAO,
Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 54-55. In a similar vein, a 2009 report of
the collections efforts of the City of Los Angeles noted many of the same problems
that had been identified in audit reports going back to at least 1991. Madler, supra
note 15.
281.

EPA, OIG Audit 2010, supra note 161, at 17 (emphasis added).

282. See GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that OSM management prioritized “achieving compliance” over fine collections). Similarly, in response to an
audit criticizing it for failing to record fines as accounts receivables, the CDIR
stated that it had “discussed establishing an accounts receivable procedure in the
past but budget considerations determined that our limited resources should be
focused on enforcement issues.” Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, Attach. A at
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view collections of penalties as part of its job, it is only to be expected that agency personnel will not vigorously pursue collections.
IV. Root Causes of Agency Undercollection
We have established that undercollection of fines is a significant yet correctible problem, not caused solely by factors outside agencies’ control. If agencies should and could be doing better, why are they not? Using applicable research in psychology, administrative law, and organizational behavior, we
identify a number of potential explanations for agencies’ inadequacy in this area
of enforcement. In this Part, we analyze the role in agencies’ collections failures
played by: insufficient resources; individual incentives; institutional incentives;
agency capture; and confusion and blame-shifting by different participants in
the collections process.
A. Insufficient Resources
An agency may simply lack the quantity of asset investigators or collections
personnel needed to devote sufficient time and attention to each case.283 For
example, between 1995 and 1999, average staffing levels at DOJ’s FLUs increased
only 6%, while the number of assessments increased 45% and the average dollar
amount of outstanding debts per staff increased by over 160%.284 This “weaken[ed] their ability to aggressively follow up on and enforce collections.”285
Customs was likewise hamstrung by limited staffing.286 State agencies similarly
suffer: An audit of Oregon’s collection found a direct correlation between high
caseloads and low collections.287
3. Although agencies must necessarily make hard choices in allocating finite
resources, the implication that improving collections is not an “enforcement issue” is troubling.
283. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 35 (“Within the U.S. attorneys’ offices, collections, especially criminal fine collections, . . . suffer from staffing problems.”); id. at 36 (“[T]he use of available enforcement tools can prove to be timeconsuming . . . .”); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 14, 43; Madler,
supra note 15 (citing “antiquated technology, and staff shortages,” among other
reasons for Los Angeles’ collections failures).
284. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 14 (noting that the average number
of staff at an FLU rose from 8.7 to 9.3).
285. Id. at 43. Agencies may exaggerate the problem somewhat. For example, DOJ
reiterated its invocation of insufficient staffing during a 2004 GAO audit of its
collections functions, but overlooked that it had recently received funding beginning in fiscal year 2002 for additional asset investigators. GAO, Criminal Debt
2004, supra note 12, at 18-19.
286. GAO, Customs 2002, supra note 92, at 25-26.
287. Oregon Audit, supra note 131, at 3.
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Employing dedicated collections personnel has improved collections.288 But
many agencies require their employees to allocate their time between the collections function and myriad others, including rulemaking, investigating possible
rule violations, and assessing penalties for violations.289 Having employees who
cannot spend enough time on collections is the functional equivalent of not
having enough employees. Moreover, personnel who have not been hired
exclusively or primarily for collections are less likely to have the training and
experience that will facilitate effective collection.290
Merely having a sufficient number of staff will not effectuate collections if
an insufficient budget leads to poorly qualified staff who cannot be trained and
lack access to necessary technology.291 Low salaries erode morale, reduce incentives to perform, and impede recruitment of highly qualified individuals in the
first place.292 An agency that cannot afford to attract well-qualified specialists
will also likely lack resources to invest in on-the-job training.293 And even wellpaid, well-trained personnel will not perform optimally if they lack the requisite
technology to investigate assets, record fines, and track payments.294 Deficiencies in fine and collections data tracking systems have been cited in audits of
numerous agencies’ collections processes,295 and may have contributed to the
failure to collect billions in fines.296
288. See, e.g., GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 53 (discussing a Northern
District of California pilot program to employ one full-time and four part-time
former criminal investigators resulted in recovery of over $10 million).
289. Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 12 (noting an inadequate segregation of
personnel duties); GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 53 (“[N]one of
the four FLUs we visited had full-time resources dedicated to or specializing in
performing searches to identify hidden assets.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra
text accompanying notes 68-69.
290. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 18 (“The majority of chief probation officers we interviewed told us that their probation officers do not have the
time or expertise needed to conduct financial investigations.”).
291.

See GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 51-52 (“[O]nly when the right
personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right training, tools,
structure, incentives, and responsibilities is operational success possible.”).

292. Id. at 53 (noting that one official indicated that his FLU “often has difficulty in filling its lower-paying positions, such as those for debt collection agents.”).
293. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 18; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001,
supra note 64, at 53 (“[B]udget constraints limit the FLUs’ ability to provide the
additional training or hire additional staff that would enable them to collect debt
more effectively.”).
294. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 51-52.
295. See Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 11-12; GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra
note 80, at 10, 11; supra notes 107-113.
296. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 3.
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Legislatures bear responsibility for inadequate collections budgets,297
although agencies generally have some discretion in deciding what portion of
their budget is allocated to collections.298 Allocating funds to an agency’s collections functions need not reduce the funds available to pay for other agency
functions: Investment in collections could more than pay for itself.299 This
increased revenue can fund additional government services, or at least offset the
burden on taxpayers of funding existing services.300
Ultimately, lack of resources is only part of the problem of undercollection
of fines. As discussed below, broad-based structural problems pervade the fine
collection process, distorting the incentives of individual collections personnel
and the attitudes of agency leadership toward collections.
B. Individual Incentives
As scholars such as Donald Langevoort and Mark Seidenfeld have posited
(relying on theories of organizational behavior), individual agency staff
members are rational utility maximizers301 who will be motivated to act by a
complex array of interacting factors,302 primarily those occurring within the

297. GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 18 (“[The Executive Office for United States Attorneys] has not been successful in requesting additional staff for debt
collection.”).
298. Cf. GAO, OSM 2001, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that the Agency prioritized rule
compliance over fine collections).
299. See, e.g., Oregon Audit, supra note 131, at 4 (finding that the statewide median
return rate on collections costs was over eight dollars for each dollar spent);
Madler, supra note 15 (referencing strategies of the Los Angeles Commission on
Revenue Efficiency and noting that “[a]s the city looks to reduce its workforce to
save money, it must be careful not to shed revenue producing positions such as in
code and parking enforcement. Those positions, after all, have the potential to
bring in more money than they cost in salaries and benefits.”); see also infra note
386 (discussing the cost-effectiveness of contracting with private debt collection
firms).
300. Whether a particular investment in collections will yield a net-benefit is highly
fact-dependent; but so is any decision regarding whether to invest capital in a
potential revenue-generating enterprise. Given the billions in uncollected fines
that are recoverable, it stands to reason that some increase in resource allocation
to this field will be cost-effective.
301.

Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formation, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 527, 529 (1990)
(“[O]ne can posit intuitively that each decisionmaker within a bureaucracy will
act as a utility-maximizer.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 268.

302. See Langevoort, supra note 301, at 529 (summarizing a wide array of potential
incentives); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 268-81.
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confines of the agency itself.303 Staff members seek promotions and avoid firing,
demotion, or undesirable job duties.304 They also seek approval from peers,
praise from superiors, and an internal sense of satisfaction.305 Unfortunately,
few of these motivating factors are likely to push agency employees to vigorously pursue collections.
Agency personnel, particularly those not dedicated exclusively to collections, are likely to view collections as ministerial drudgery, neither as prestigious nor as intellectually rewarding as other agency functions, such as rulemaking or investigating violations.306 This disinclination toward collections is
particularly true for the type of personnel who are likely to be involved in the
fine assessment process: attorneys, investigators, and other highly-trained or

303. Langevoort, supra note 301, at 529 (citing a “vast body of research on organizational behavior that argues that the activity of bureaucracies is not characterized
by a high degree of either sensitivity or responsiveness to external stimuli. Instead,
typical behavior is more aptly described as inner-directed”); Seidenfeld, supra
note 269, at 268 (“Staff members’ most immediate job incentives come from opportunities within the agency itself.”).
304. Simon, supra note 20, at 145 (“Promotion is, of course, both an economic and a
prestige incentive.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 268-70, 274-75.
305. Simon, supra note 20, at 145 (“In addition to the salary he receives, he may value
the status and prestige that his position in the organization gives him . . . .”);
Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 268-81.
306. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 36 (“Most probation officers view
‘bill collection’ as contradictory to their rehabilitative duty . . . .”); id. at 39
(“Available enforcement techniques have rarely been used because U.S. attorneys’
offices generally place low priority on collections . . . .”); see Langevoort, supra
note 301, at 529; Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 275 (“Data suggest that in many
contexts, agency staff members prefer policy accomplishments, recognition from
others or agency loyalty, and consonance to their perceived role over pecuniary
rewards or leisure.”).
Indeed, even many private collections personnel, who, unlike agency collectors, are actually compensated for their collections performance, see infra text
accompanying notes 386-388, may find the task unrewarding, see Matthew W.
Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the FDCPA Is Failing America’s
Elderly Debtors, 16 Elder L.J. 135, 140-41 (2008) (“Working as a debt collector can
be a frustrating, mind-numbing way to make a living, and even the relatively high
pay often does not make up for the frustration of the job.”).
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educated professionals.307 Collections tend to be seen as below them; once the
sanction is imposed, collecting it is somebody else’s problem.308
Collections personnel, even if they do not view their role as unimportant,
are unlikely to have much of a personal stake in collections. Such personnel, like
most civil servants, are invariably salaried, have significant job security, and do
not work on commission,309 so their financial compensation is unaffected by
how much they collect.310 Nor are effective collections likely to lead to promotions, praise, or even informal elevated status among bosses or peers,311 particularly if the employee (or his or her department) is not dedicated to collections.
Agency personnel’s incentives may even run counter to maximizing collections. They will seek to get cases off their desks, both to minimize work312 and to
create the appearance of productivity among supervisors and colleagues.313 The
temptation is understandable. The number of cases closed is a concrete figure
well within the control of the agency, whereas a “percentage of collectible debt”

307. GAO, Criminal Fines 1985, supra note 220, at 35 (“Within the U.S. attorneys’
offices, collections, especially criminal fine collections, receive low priority . . . .”);
cf. Sherry Scheel Matteucci, Montana’s 1st Female Attorney Ella Knowles, 33 Mont.
Law. 1, 5 (2008) (describing collections as “one of the least rewarding but most
common legal tasks for a young lawyer”).
308. See Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 277-78 (“Counsel’s Office in an agency will have
lawyers who, by virtue of their legal schooling, see themselves as fulfilling a role of
implementing law.”).
309. Similarly, in a civil service system, bonuses, if they exist, are not typically tied to
collections; and in any event, the incentive of a year-end bonus is more attenuated
than a direct commission.
310.

Langevoort, supra note 301, at 529 (observing that governmental agencies “lack the
discipline imposed by a competitive marketplace,” and “line personnel are protected from rapid replacement by civil service regulations”); Seidenfeld, supra
note 269, at 274 (“If supervisors have little authority to penalize lazy workers, staff
members have an incentive to do little work for their pay.”). Staff members who
perform poorly may be assigned undesirable job duties or transferred to an undesirable location, see Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 268, but simply performing mediocre work is unlikely to incur these consequences.

311.

See Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 270 (“[O]pportunities for promotions are
limited and a staff member must affirmatively make a good name for himself in
order to have any chance to secure a promotion.”).

312.

Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 274 (“[E]conomically rational bureaucrats have an
interest in maximizing their leisure, which translates into a preference for minimizing their workloads.”).

313.

Cf. GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 68 (noting that neither DOJ nor
U.S. courts wanted to take responsibility for disclosing receivables for relevant
criminal debt). Conversely, non-dedicated personnel may not even desire this
appearance of success, lest they gain reputations as collection experts and be assigned greater roles in collections.
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benchmark requires a labor-intensive determination regarding what is “collectible,” in addition to the labor-intensive effort to recover those amounts.314
C. Institutional Incentives
Incentives may be misaligned for agency management as well as for lowerlevel personnel. If senior management or an agency head does not prioritize
collections, neither will lower-level staff members.315 As discussed above, deprioritization of collections at high levels has been observed at a number of
agencies.316
The attitudes of an agency’s leadership toward collections can be better understood by examining the leaders’ incentives, which may vary depending on

314.

When audited by the GAO, the SEC and CFTC reported fine collection rates
approaching 100%. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 2 (91% and 86%,
respectively); GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 42 tbl.5 (91% and 99%,
respectively). However, these figures reflect percentages collected on total fines
levied in closed cases. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 2; GAO, SEC
and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 42 tbl.5. This is entirely circular: If the agency is
able to collect, it will close the case. In essence, these agencies reported that in cases in which they collected virtually all the amounts levied, they collected virtually
all the amounts levied. Collection rates for all cases, including open ones, were
much lower: 49% and 45%, respectively. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note
80, at 23, 42.

315.

See, e.g., GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 2 (“[U]ntil top management [at DOJ and the AOUSC] placed a higher priority on ensuring that the entities involved in the criminal debt collection process more effectively and efficiently pursued collection efforts, the assessment of criminal fines and restitution as an
effective punitive tool would be jeopardized, and valuable, limited resources
would continue to be wasted on duplicative efforts.” (citing GAO, Criminal
Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 11)); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 275 (“A staff
member may be able to act less carefully on a matter that has not attracted attention of a supervisor or others higher up in the agency.”).

316.

See supra text accompanying notes 289-290. As an example, the CMS failed to
perform detailed audit work on its $260 million in outstanding civil monetary penalties—almost all of which related to Medicare fraud and abuse cases—because
this amount represented only 3% of the Agency’s total Medicare receivables, and
so was deemed immaterial. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 8, 10. But collection
of these fines could go a long way toward funding the CMS’ other operations.
Moreover, unlike collection of other receivables, it would also serve a deterrent
function; if anything, the Agency should be more focused on collecting these
debts, not less. Cf. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 261, at 5 (“We take action to
collect taxes against people who have not committed crimes. If people commit
crimes and are fined, I expect us to be 50 times more aggressive in collecting those
fines . . . .” (statement by Sen. Dorgan)).
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the “type” of leader. Mark Seidenfeld has identified three categories of agency
heads: “careerists,” “politicians,” and “professionals.”317
Careerists who wish to remain with the agency “can best maintain their
positions by lying low and not doing anything that attracts attention.”318 Thus,
unless government watchdogs, the media or others draw attention to undercollection, such agency heads have little incentive to actively address the problem
and improve collections. Politicians will “try to generate public name recognition by taking action that attracts the attention of the press.”319 But good press is
achieved by announcing the imposition of large fines; collecting them simply
does not make for big headlines.320 And professionals—agency heads hired for
their industry knowledge or connections—are prone to the risk of capture by
firms within the industries they regulate, and so may be disincentivized to vigorously enforce collections efforts.321
Regardless of self-interest, all three types of leaders are likely to be more interested in the policy-oriented aspects of their role than the ministerial aspects.
Enforcement of penalties for violations of agency rules certainly promotes agency policy, but the collections component of the enforcement process is likely to
be viewed as primarily or purely ministerial and of little interest to senior personnel.322
There may be other psychological factors that explain agency leaders’ disinclination to focus on changing and improving the collections process. One such
factor is “prospect theory.” This theory “predicts a bias against agency action
when the agency faces a choice between imposing certain losses to avoid uncertain ones or to create the potential for uncertain gains.”323 Current collections
practices may leave billions in uncollected fines on the table, but agency leaders
may not want to risk seeking more funding for collections because they do not
want to bear the risk that collections will not sufficiently improve and thus that
the additional funding will be deemed to have been wasted. Better to do poorly
with little than risk doing poorly with a lot.
Indeed, concerns regarding funding may play a critical role. By requesting
additional funding, an agency effectively would be admitting that it is not currently adequately accomplishing its delegated functions. But agency heads of all
317.

Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 281 & n.100 (citing James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 131, 197-200
(1989)).

318.

Id. at 281.

319.

Id. at 282.

320. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118, 179-184.
321.

Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 283; cf. Madler, supra note 15 (noting that Los Angeles city agency personnel at all levels are reluctant to collect so as to avoid angering powerful local businesses).

322. See supra notes 306-308 and accompanying text.
323.
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Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 289.
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stripes want to demonstrate that they are competent, and they do not want to
admit to existing deficiencies,324 thereby making them reluctant to establish the
very facts that would warrant additional funds.
Conversely, even if agency heads are willing to argue that they could
improve collections with more funding, Congress—not wanting to throw good
money after bad—may be reluctant to increase funding unless the agency can
establish its ability to collect effectively. The collections process may suffer as a
result of this chicken-and-egg conundrum, with the agency claiming it cannot
collect unless it has more funds, and the legislature not wanting to give more
funds until the agency can show it can collect.325
Agency heads may also de-emphasize collections to minimize judicial scrutiny. Agency heads prefer autonomy and flexibility;326 but judicial review of
administrative sanctions imposes constraints on agency freedom.327 Agencies
may prefer to compromise administrative fines for less than they otherwise
might. This compromise may reflect not only the desire to save litigation costs,
but also the desire to avoid a full-blown contest that could result in judicial
review and the establishment of precedents regarding the scope and exercise of
the agency’s fining authority.328
324. Id. at 295; Downs, supra note 20 at 279 (“Every bureau ideology . . . [s]tresses the
high present level of the bureau’s efficiency . . . [and e]mphasizes its achievements
and future capabilities and ignores or minimizes its failures and inabilities.”). For
example, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, in response to an audit
identifying numerous agency inefficiencies and failures, claimed that no “serious
deficiencies exist in the collection process with the exception of the lack of human
resources.” GAO, Criminal Debt 2001, supra note 64, at 97. The institution had
been effectively called out for not doing the best it could with what it had, but insisted it could do better only if it were given more to work with.
325.

There may also be the inverse problem: Agencies may risk funding if they establish that they are doing too well. The legislature may be inclined to direct money
to failing entities or areas, and freeze or even reduce funding for those government elements that have established that they can do well on a shoestring.

326. Downs, supra note 20, at 266 (“Leaders of all large organizations are opposed to
detailed investigations of the behavior of their organizations by outsiders.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 285.
327.

See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
Duke L.J. 300, 300-03, 308-13; Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 251-52.

328. See supra Subsection I.B.1 regarding the scope of judicial review of agency fine and
penalty assessments. Admittedly, an agency’s desire to avoid judicial review would
have greater relevance at the fine assessment stage than at the fine collection stage,
since (as the agency would expect) a violator would not likely be willing to waive
its right to challenge the assessed fine on appeal based on the possibility that the
agency will eschew collection of it. However, an agency could impose the larger
fine (and obtain the public relation benefits therefrom) and then hastily write off
a large portion of it (possibly in consultation with the offender itself, in a form of
post-assessment settlement), thereby minimizing the violator’s incentive to fight it
503

Article

- Ross-Pritikin - 20 - Final - 2011.05.31

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

6/3/2011 10:12 AM

29 : 453

2011

D. Agency Capture
In its most common form, agency capture theory329 holds that if an agency
comes to be dominated by personnel formerly employed by firms in the industry the agency is regulating—or by personnel who hope to join those firms after
leaving the agency330—they will cater to the interests of the firms.331 Capture
could affect either agency leadership or lower-level bureaucrats involved in fine
collections.332
One might expect agency capture to affect fine imposition more than
collection: Captured agency personnel would better serve the regulated firm by
declining to find that a violation occurred, or by imposing a light fine if a violation is found.333 Thus, agency capture might even be expected to improve collection rates as it would tend to reduce the frequency or severity of fines initially
imposed.

on appeal rather than simply pay the reduced fine. But, as discussed above, limitations on agency documentation and disclosure make it difficult to assess the extent to which this is occurring. See supra Section III.A.
329. We are discussing capture separately here, but recognize that it could be viewed as
another type of incentive problem. Generally, these “categories” of agency failures
are artificial, and may overlap.
330. Langevoort, supra note 301, at 529; Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 271-72.
331.

Langevoort, supra note 301, at 528 (explaining that public choice theory
posits that regulators will allocate benefits to those groups that provide
the greatest levels of support, including those industries they are supposed
to be regulating); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 271-73; see Anne C. Mulkern,
Watchdogs or Lap Dogs? When Advocates Become Regulators, Denver Post, May
24, 2004, at A-01 (noting that at least one hundred high-level Bush Administration
officials regulated industries they once represented as lobbyists, lawyers, or company advocates); Mike Palmedo, Revolving Door Between U.S. Government and Industry, Consumer Project on Tech. (Feb. 2006), http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/politics/revolvingdoor.html (listing former members of governmental
agencies and/or Congress now representing the pharmaceutical industry).

332.

Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 271-73, 283. A 2009 report on the City of Los Angeles
revealed a surprisingly candid assessment of agency capture by large local businesses. See Madler, supra note 15 (“Many management staff across all departments
explained that collection activities do not necessarily receive a high priority
because of their interest in maintaining effective working relationships with
payees.”).

333.

Jesse Westbrook & David Scheer, Cox’s SEC Hindered Probe, Slowed Cases, Shrank
Fines, GAO Says, Bloomberg, May 6, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=aPus5C5B.JhQ (noting that the SEC’s chairman was found by its
enforcement-unit lawyers to have opposed fining companies; fines and restitution
collected fell from $3 billion in prior years to $1 billion under his watch).
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However, it is just as likely that agency capture would undermine collections but not fine imposition. Promoting a regulated firm’s interests at the
expense of the agency’s is risky; thus, capture is more likely to occur where the
captured staff member’s efforts are less publicly visible or less subject to supervisorial scrutiny.334 Unlike policymaking or adjudication, collections is virtually
invisible to the public and not likely to draw much attention from agency management (particularly if the agency culture is unsupportive).
There are also great incentives for a captured agency to fail to adequately
collect fines because it is a win-win situation. The agency garners the public
relations benefit of appearing to be a tough enforcer and spares the regulated
firm from bearing the negative effect of the fine. In fact, the firm also gets the
public relations benefit of the façade of contrition. The loser, of course, is the
public that depends on the agency to follow through on its regulatory mission.
Moreover, a modified form of agency capture by industry participants may
occur if the regulated firm can make the staff member’s job easier or more difficult by controlling access to information the staffer needs to do his job.335
Collections personnel often require accurate information regarding a regulated
firm’s assets and income in order to effectively prioritize and pursue collection
of fines and penalties. Much of this information is most readily obtained from
the firms themselves. Thus, collections personnel may be particularly prone to
this form of capture.
Yet another potential form of capture is political capture, in which elected
officials or branches may co-opt regulatory agencies for their own purposes.336
The recent Bush Administration, known for its anti-regulatory leanings,
appointed an SEC chairman who opposed fining corporations, which resulted
in drastically reduced enforcement of the agency’s rules.337 Such capture may
also affect collections: The political branches may put pressure on agencies to
chase headlines and impose large fines while at the same time either disregarding the collection of those fines, or failing to provide the requisite resources to
adequately pursue them.338
334. Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 272 n.70.
335.

Id. at 273.

336. See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 479,
537 (2010); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 256 (“Congress and the President greatly
influence agency agendas, both by establishing procedures that stack the deck toward agency outcomes that favor constituents whom they want to benefit and by
monitoring and funding programs that they desire.”). But see id. at 256 (citing
evidence “that political principals cannot easily direct agency officials to follow
their bidding”).
337.

See Westbrook & Scheer, supra note 333.

338.

Todd, supra note 104. Indeed, scholars who advocate more stringent regulatory
enforcement without focusing on whether the agency has the means or wherewithal to follow through on that enforcement may be recommending reforms that
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E. Confusion and Blame-Shifting
Confusion regarding which of several agencies is responsible for collections
can also thwart collections success.339 For instance, the CMS’ accounting records
reflected that certain delinquent debts were the responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General, whereas they
were in fact the responsibility of DOJ.340 Similarly, the California Public Utilities
Commission’s Consumer Protection and Safety Division believed that the
Agency’s Legal Division was responsible for collections,341 whereas attorneys at
the Legal Division did not believe collections were their responsibility.342 In the
criminal fine collection context, a Senator noted that “the bureaucracy here is
so convoluted that you cannot plug things together.”343
Similarly, due to inadequate communication between the CFTC’s Division
of Trading and Markets and its Division of Enforcement, a fine of over $7 million was not referred to Treasury’s Financial Management Services for collection for more than two years.344
Often, however, the failure to work together is not the result of mere
inadvertence. Agency employees have powerful motivations to shirk work and
avoid blame.345 Although a bureaucrat wants to appear to be—and actually be—
successful at accomplishing duties,346 it is easier to claim success by narrowing
the scope of duties than by doing a better job.
Collections is an area that is particularly prone to responsibility shifting
because of how the task of collections is perceived.347 Partial collections will
tend to be framed as failures, rather than as successes. Agencies and agency personnel naturally will not want to be associated with an area that is more likely to
draw blame than praise. This may be why finger-pointing was so prevalent

actually exacerbate the undercollection problem. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or
Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 Va. L. Rev. 785 (2009) (discussing other scholars’ limited proposals).
339. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
340. GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 12.
341.

Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at 9.

342. Id. at 9.
343.

1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 261, at 28 (statement of Sen. Dorgan).

344. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 25.
345. Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 274-75.
346. Id. at 275.
347. Id. at 289 (explaining that whether an outcome is viewed as positive or negative
depends on the how the reference point is framed).
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during the failed effort to reform federal criminal fine collections.348 With
collections, the agencies are fighting an inverted turf war, trying to give up as
much ground as possible. Ironically, agencies’ inability to cooperate thus makes
centralization of collections necessary349 (to eliminate opportunities for blameshifting and finger-pointing) and, at the same time, highly unlikely to occur
(because the centralization effort itself requires inter-agency comity).
In this Part, we outlined potential explanations for agencies’ collections
failures. The incentive problems that undermine a commitment to collections
at the personnel and management levels of administrative agencies likely lie at
the heart of undercollection. Although a lack of resources plays a role, it does
not explain why agency collectors do not make the most of the funding and
tools they already have. And other explanations, like blame-shifting, appear to
flow in large part from the underlying distortion in agency incentives. Incentive-based commitment to collections is apparently a prerequisite to collections
success.
V. Recommendations
Some proposals to address administrative agencies’ pervasive undercollection problems involve reforms within the existing institutional framework,
whereas others involve removing responsibility for collections from the agencies
in whole or in part.350 In other words, some propose to fix the system while
others propose to replace it. In this Part, we first examine several options that
fall into the “fix it” category: adding resources to collections efforts; locating
collections responsibilities exclusively with in-house collections specialists
rather than personnel with general enforcement duties; and restructuring col348. GAO, Criminal Debt 2004, supra note 12, at 13; GAO, Criminal Debt 2001,
supra note 64, at 69; GAO, National Fine Center 1995, supra note 260, at 24; see
supra text accompanying notes 251-258.
349. See Madler, supra note 15 (noting that Los Angeles city officials and auditors recommend centralization of collections under a “Collections Sheriff,” on the rationale that “[a] single person . . . would work with all the departments and be there
to take credit—or the blame—for what money does come in”).
350. Our proposals are limited to the goal of improving the collection of monetary
sanctions. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate options that would
expand collections to unconventional “payments,” such as extracting services
rather than money (e.g., an oil company might help clean a different company’s
spill rather than paying for unrelated violations); “extra-legal” compliance (e.g.,
the EPA could require an offender to construct “green” infrastructure exceeding
current environmental requirements); or an ownership/control interest in corporate offenders (e.g., an agency could receive an equity interest in the offending
corporation, entitling it to a say in the conduct of, and/or in a decision whether to
continue business or induce a bankruptcy of, the offender). See, e.g., Gruner,
supra note 202, at 292-95 (discussing corporate community service); Kennedy,
supra note 6, at 460-68 (discussing “equity fines”).
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lections-based incentives in various ways. We then discuss more radical options
that would replace aspects of the current system: delegating collections responsibilities to private or public interest firms; or selling collections rights through
debt auctions. We argue that any reform must take into account institutional
and individual incentives, and that more ambitious changes should be
attempted only if less drastic reforms have proven ineffective. Specifically, we
conclude that governments should first try reforms within the agencies—for
example, specializing the collections function and tethering aspects of collectors’ pay or agency funding to collections performance—and progress to more
radical, “replace it”-style solutions only if internal reforms fail.
A. Fix It—Reform Agencies’ Collections Processes
1. Optimize Existing Approaches
Additional Resources. Agencies often attribute low collection rates to insufficient funding and manpower.351 But boosting human and financial capital is
easier said than done. Federal and state governments are running record
deficits. Even if money is available, lawmakers may not view increased funding
of collections as a good investment of their political capital. Agency collections
rates do not make headlines like oil spills, Ponzi schemes, or rampant unemployment.352 Of course, if agencies’ dismal collection rates were better publicized, perhaps public outrage would generate greater political will.353 Nevertheless, not only is there a risk that increased funding may not improve collection
rates354—a measurable benchmark for which lawmakers will be blamed—but
whatever increases may result are likely to be gradual and incremental, not the
type of flashy reforms for which credit can swiftly be taken.355 Thus, it is unlikely
that funding levels for collections will increase dramatically, at least in the
absence of other reforms.
Moreover, boosting resources will not necessarily motivate agency leadership to devote sufficient energy or attention to collections if there is more bang
351.

See supra Section IV.A.

352.

A thorough analysis of the political dynamics that would lead legislators to overlook or downplay such a seemingly attractive source of revenue is beyond the
scope of this Article, but is an issue that one of the authors (Professor Ross)
intends to explore in a subsequent piece.

353.

See Madler, supra note 15 (“Some bills have gone unpaid for years and not until
the city spiraled down into a fiscal crisis did the importance of getting that money
open the eyes of policy makers.”).

354. Increased funding without other reforms might even depress collection rates if it
entrenches ineffective undercollection practices.
355.
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Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 282 (noting that a political actor “will tend to take
action for which she can claim credit and avoid action for which she can be
blamed”).
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for the buck in announcing impressive initial assessments.356 Nor will an
increase in resources prevent agency staff members from perceiving collections
as menial, thankless work.357
On the other hand, funding can serve a signaling function, so increased
funding for collections may convey its importance.358 Staff members who understand collections to be an integral part of the agency mission may be less
likely to shirk collections work and shift their time and energy to other tasks.
And regulators who see their collections role as prioritized may be less subject
to capture by regulated entities, as the “premium” required to compromise
their duties may be higher.
Ultimately, supplementing resources and funding is politically and practically difficult and would not address the root causes of undercollection–
misaligned incentives, as discussed above in Sections IV.B and IV.C. Therefore,
funding is at best an incomplete approach to the problem.
Improve Utilization of Conventional Collection Tools. Agencies could
improve collections by using tools already available to them. For example, when
a violator cannot pay immediately, an agency can establish a payment plan,
allowing the imposition of higher total penalties and facilitating collection.359
Increased targeted reliance on installment plans could thus improve overall
collection rates.
A tougher issue is how to get agencies to more effectively use such tools.
Guidelines already exist at many agencies that govern the usage of collections
tools and processes; yet agencies routinely neglect to follow them and often
disregard auditors’ recommendations that they do so.360 Some guidelines may
provide insufficient direction. For example, vague guidance to use installment
plans “when appropriate”361 may not be as effective as a checklist delineating
356. See supra text accompanying notes 114-119, 179-184.
357.

See supra text accompanying notes 324-326.

358.

Congress can appropriate money for an agency to use for a particular purpose,
and can similarly prohibit appropriated money from being used for a particular
purpose. Peterson, supra note 91, at 337 (“[Congress can] describe
the purposes for which the funds may be used, the length of time the funds may
remain available for these uses, and the maximum amount an agency may spend
on particular elements of a program. In this manner, Congress may, and often
does, use its appropriation power to accomplish policy objectives and to establish
priorities among federal programs.” (quoting 1 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 1-5 (3d ed. 2004))).

359. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 7 (noting that CFTC saw fine collections increase 5% after increasing use of installment plans).
360. See supra Subsections III.B.1 and III.B.2.
361.

See, e.g., GAO, CMS 2001, supra note 62, at 12 (“[I]nformal policies and procedures do not . . . contain specific guidance on recording due dates for payments
being made through payment plans . . . .”).
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precisely when and how to apply such plans.362 Thus, one solution may be to
provide more concrete guidelines and instructions. But many guidelines are
concrete, yet are still disregarded.363 Indeed, agency staff may react to new, highly-defined requirements not by doing better, but by shirking even more.364
Thus, more concrete requirements, standing alone, may not solve the problem.
Even if improved guidelines are not counter-productive, they (like increased resources) still do little to address agency staffers’ lack of incentives to
pursue collections vigorously. For reforms to be effective, they will likely need
to address why agencies do what they do, not merely how they do it. Therefore,
as we discuss below in Subsections V.A.2 and V.A.3, other mechanisms, like
specialization of the collections function, will better focus agencies’ attention on
the problem of undercollection.
2. Specialization
The lack of dedicated collections personnel hampers collections.365 Establishing collections-only positions could carry several advantages, such as
promoting expertise, reducing confusion, and improving employee incentives
for effectively collecting.
First, specialization promotes expertise. Managers can hire employees based
on collections-related interest, skills and experience. And because collections
would be these bureaucrats’ sole job function, new employees could be expected
to learn a job’s requirements much more quickly.
Second, demarcating the line between collections and non-collections
personnel would reduce confusion regarding collection roles and responsibili-

362. Cf. Atul Gawande, The Checklist, The New Yorker, Dec. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/12/10/071210fa_fact_gawande
(describing how fields as diverse as emergency room care and airline piloting have
improved dramatically through the use of mandatory checklists).
363. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 245.
364. Downs, supra note 20, at 262 (“The greater the effort made by a sovereign or toplevel officials to control the behavior of subordinate officials, the greater the
efforts made by those subordinates to evade or counteract such control.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 302-03 (“The need for an agency to comply with procedural requirements adds costs to the decision-making process, and in that sense . . .
discourages agency action.”).
365. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82, 324-326. The California State Controller
found that the “lack of duty segregation,” Chiang, CPUC Audit, supra note 81, at
11, between collections and other enforcement functions in various agencies
“represents a serious internal control weakness, as it does not provide the
adequate checks and balances that would prevent errors and irregularities,”
Chiang, DIR Audit, supra note 99, at 12.
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ties. This both promotes efficient and effective performance of collections tasks,
and reduces opportunities for finger-pointing and blame-shifting.366
Third, designating collections personnel could boost employee pride in the
collections function. Changing collections from one task among many assigned
to employees to the only task assigned would ensure that employees would not
deprioritize it.367 Individuals interested in collections would be more likely to
choose the pure collections role in the first place. This, in turn, may reduce
capture risk, as increased role identification could bolster collectors’ resistance
to compromising their bureaucratic responsibilities.
There are, however, potential drawbacks. Collections specialization would
mean that the agency staffers who shepherded a case from the stages of investigation to liability assessment to penalty imposition would not be the ones to
follow the case through to the collection stage. Staffers who have lived with a
case since its inception may become invested in it and so have an interest in
ensuring that it is handled thoroughly to its conclusion. Separate collections
personnel, however, would not necessarily share the commitment to see that a
particular offender is brought to justice.
Further, specialization may serve to increase the risk of capture in certain
ways. Regulated entities may rationally decide to focus their capture efforts on
collections personnel, reasoning that they are more isolated, less closely monitored, and less visible than other enforcement personnel.368
Moreover, segregating collections personnel would not necessarily have a
substantial impact if the underlying goals and priorities of the agency were not
changed. For example, if collectors understood their priority to be closing as
many cases as possible, that could cause collectors to accept low payments for
each case as a means to quickly resolve matters. The fact that they did not have
non-collection duties would not necessarily ameliorate the underlying problem.369
However, the benefits of specialization outweigh these speculative drawbacks. The contention that the regulators who set the fines are the best people
to collect the fines seems unlikely because agency enforcement personnel who
perform a variety of duties often view collections as menial and thankless.370
Nor would specialization necessarily increase capture risks, particularly because
366. See Madler, supra note 15 (observing that the potential benefit of a “Collections
Sheriff” is that he would “be there to take credit—or the blame—for what money
does come in.”); supra Subsection III.B.2.
367. Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 295-96 (“[O]nce a potential problem within an individual’s official authority is identified, the individual is likely to see his role as
calling for action to try to cure the problem.”). Indeed, separate collections units
could promote healthy competition within each agency. Downs, supra note 20, at
265 (“Every part of a bureau is partly competitive with every other part.”).
368. See supra text accompanying note 332.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 330-332.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 324-326.
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specialists would likely take more pride in their collections work and thus could
be less likely to abandon their responsibilities. Finally, although segregation
might not be a complete solution—particularly if other agency goals push
against effective collections—it is an important step in the right direction and
could, in itself, signal to agency personnel the increased prioritization of collections.
There are two primary approaches to specialization: (1) creating special
units within each agency; or (2) creating a centralized collections agency. Each
approach carries potential benefits and disadvantages.
Intra-Agency Collection Units. In-house collections units have already been
tried with success in some agencies,371 and could serve as models for intraagency specialization. However, dispersal of collections responsibilities among
specialized units within different agencies may exacerbate problems with interagency coordination and cooperation such as those experienced by DOJ and
AOUSC personnel in collecting criminal debt.372 Further, if personnel are
shunted from generalized enforcement duties to pure collections, there is the
risk they may feel marginalized. However, as discussed above, specialization is
more likely to have an overall morale-boosting effect. Further, if assignments to
collections units are based on candidates’ interest and experience in collections,
such self-selection will counteract any risk of feelings of marginalization.
Centralization. A centralized agency dedicated to collecting fines for other
agencies would help solve the problem of coordinating separate collection
units.373 On the other hand, creating new, free-standing entities could be expensive, logistically difficult, and politically challenging, as was illustrated by the
failed attempt to establish the National Fine Center.374 Central agency staffers,
like in-house collections specialists, may lack a sense of personal investment in
371.

See, e.g., GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 7 (noting that the SEC
improved its collection rate eight percentage points over the preceding four-year
timeframe when it established a “staff position to serve as a focal point for collecting fines.”).

372.

See supra Subsection III.B.2 (describing the multi-year failure of DOJ and AOUSC
to either establish an effective information-sharing protocol, or to develop and
implement a centralized fine collections bureau).

373.

See Lewandoski, supra note 250, at 248 (“The government could consolidate debts
in a single agency or have a single agency handle all assessments and collections,
greatly simplifying the debt collection process.”).

374. See supra Subsection III.B.2. Yet centralization is not unprecedented: The Treasury Department’s Financial Management Services has general collection responsibility for most delinquent federal debt. See supra text accompanying note 78.
Any new collection-focused agency might mimic Treasury’s program, but simply
handle collections at the initial, not delinquent, stage. Indeed, one possible approach is to simply build more (or earlier) collections responsibility into Treasury’s existing program.
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particular cases. Moreover, although centralization could remove certain coordination barriers, it could also create new ones with enforcement personnel
from referring agencies. It may be more difficult or time consuming (or referring personnel may be less willing) to share offender or case history information
with central collections personnel than with specialized collectors within the referring agency itself.
Ultimately, specialization is a promising direction for improving collections
performance. Although risks exist, many potential drawbacks are speculative,
and specialized collection units have already been tried with success by some
agencies. As between different forms of specialization, implementing in-house
collection groups is a more realistic model than implementing a centralized collection agency, both because agencies have already profitably employed
in-house units in different contexts, and because prior efforts at centralization
have proved so problematic.
3. Restructure Underlying Incentives
Specialization may have indirect effects on agency and agency staff incentives. Other potential reforms could attempt to target performance incentives
directly.
Performance Standards and Review. As discussed above, agencies generally
neglect to systematically evaluate their own fine collections performance. When
they do so, collections tend to improve.375
An initial step in performance evaluation is formulating performance standards. Developing performance standards that accurately assess success without
encouraging individuals to game the system can be challenging. For example, if
performance is evaluated primarily based on collections rates, regulators might
cynically reduce initial assessments of fines in order to artificially increase the
percentage collected.
If employees assessing fines are distinct from those collecting them, and are
evaluated only based on performance of their own discrete duties, there would
be less motivation for non-collectors to depress fines.376 Aside from creating
separate performance standards, agencies could also discourage employees from
gaming the system by establishing performance standards that rely on factors
besides collection rates. For example, factoring total assessments as well as
collection rates into a performance-gauging formula could counterbalance the
motivation to underassess fines. Similarly, collections performance could be
gauged in part by compliance with selected best practices such as how frequent-

375.

See generally GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 9-10 (reporting that
collections rates doubled in the years following a previous GAO report).

376. The incentives of agency heads may still lean toward underassessment, but it may
be more difficult to induce subordinates to pursue such a policy.
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ly and timely collection personnel conduct asset discovery or pursue liens or
other prejudgment remedies.
In addition to formulating well-calibrated performance standards, agencies
can formally review or audit collections performance at both the agency and
individual collector level. In general, external audits tend to be more rigorous
than internal ones;377 but as we have seen, many agencies have brushed off
recommendations even of outside oversight agencies.378 Although detailed feedback is an essential element of any effective review,379 feedback alone may not be
enough. Performance reviews may need to be directly tethered to concrete consequences for agencies and agency staffers in order to counteract the incentives
to de-prioritize collections work.380
Encouraging Competition Through Performance Disclosure. Another way to
improve incentives is to encourage competition, both among agency staff and
among agencies, by disclosing collection performances. If agencies disclose
individual collectors’ performance to their colleagues, staff members may try to
meet or exceed the performance of their co-workers.381 However, if many
collectors are weak performers, disclosure might communicate that poor work
is normal, reinforcing practices that lead to undercollection. Agencies might
therefore disclose to employees only top collectors’ performances. But this, too,
could backfire: Instead of fostering healthy competition, it might bond low
performers against the few high performers.382
Mandatory public disclosure of collections performance could provide
broader benefits by stoking collections performance competition at the agency

377.

Downs, supra note 20, at 271 (“Surveillance bureaus with career paths separate
from those of the agencies they monitor are much more zealous about detecting
and reporting behavior undesirable to top-level officials than are surveillance
bureaus without separate career paths.”).

378. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
379. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 90 (“Well-designed systems tell people
when they are doing well and when they are making mistakes.”).
380. Any system for gathering collections information should account for distortions
in regulators’ communication of data. See Downs, supra note 20, at 266 (“Each
official tends to distort the information he passes upward in the hierarchy, exaggerating those data favorable to himself and minimizing those unfavorable to
himself.”); id. at 269 (“Use of redundant information channels increases the probability of obtaining accurate information.”).
381.

See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 65 (“If choice architects want to shift
behavior and to do so with a nudge, they might simply inform people about what
other people are doing.”).

382. See Downs, supra note 20, at 263 (“As the proportion of climbers in a bureau
rises, a higher proportion of their efforts is devoted to internal politics and rivalry
rather than performance of their social functions.”).
514

Article

- Ross-Pritikin - 20 - Final - 2011.05.31

6/3/2011 10:12 AM

THE COLLECTION GAP

level.383 Such disclosure could also defeat agencies’ tendency to selectively
disclose only impressive-sounding initial penalty assessments.384 However,
agencies’ failure to improve their collections performance in the wake of GAO
reports of poor collections performance data for a number of agencies may
indicate that public disclosure, alone, is unlikely to encourage better collections.
Thus, despite the theoretical benefits of performance disclosures, it is
unclear whether disclosures, standing alone, would do much to actually improve collections.
Rewarding Performance. Rewards in the form of collections-based commissions, bonuses, or promotions can powerfully motivate bureaucrats by giving
them a tangible stake in collections outcomes.385 Likewise, if agencies know that
part of their funding is tethered to collections performance, or if regulators get
to keep some portion of the amounts they collect, they may make collections
more of a priority. Concrete rewards for performance could also minimize capture pressures: Agency personnel would be giving up more by compromising
their public duties, and the prospect of future employment in the private sector
may be less tempting.
There are several objections to rewarding individual collector performance
in this manner, none of which defeats the potential benefits. First, such rewards
are arguably unseemly: Government officials should be seeking to enforce the
law, not to generate more revenue for themselves. But the fact that the civil servants tasked with collection of administrative fines currently have no personal
motivation to thoroughly or efficiently perform their duties is arguably at least
as offensive to the public as the alternative of giving them a stake in the matter.

383.

However, agencies may take the view that fine collections in different industries
are simply not comparable. For example, the OSM claims that its low collection
rates are due to the insolvency of many mining firms, GAO, OSM 2001, supra note
13, at 2, whereas the SEC collected from better-capitalized financial firms during
the period of time reviewed, GAO, SEC and CFTC 2005, supra note 80, at 23.

384. See Downs, supra note 20, at 266 (acknowledging bureaucrats’ inclination to
exaggerate favorable data and de-emphasize unfavorable information). Obviously,
if agencies could hide fine print disclosures in far corners of websites, disclosure
requirements might have little effect. Moreover, disclosure of raw numbers or information—without a rating scheme or benchmark comparison—would likely
mean little to the public or even to some lawmakers.
385.

Downs, supra note 20, at 264 (“An organization can maintain high-quality personnel even if it does not experience relatively rapid growth in size, so long as it
experiences such growth in the incentives it offers its members.”). But cf. Simon
Burgess et al., Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government
Agency (CMPO Working Paper Series No. 04/103, 2004), available at http://ideas
.repec.org/p/bri/cmpowp/04-103.html (showing that whether incentives change
performance among civil servants may depend on the size of the team whose performance is being measured).
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Second, financial incentives could compromise regulators’ integrity. This
could lead to over-deterrence: Collectors may employ expensive asset seizure
techniques, even where it is not cost-effective to do so, in order to maximize
their personal bonuses. Similarly, collections agents might insist on ruinously
large up-front payments from offending companies, when longer-term installment plans would be more fair and sensible, in order to line their own pockets.
However, financial incentives are not likely to over-deter because they would
encourage thorough collections of fines already assessed, rather than excessive
initial assessment of penalties (which could over-deter, but which could actually
hurt collection rates). This risk might exist if bureaucrats tasked with enforcement are also tasked with collections, highlighting the need to segregate these
job functions.
Third, such incentives may lead to a form of corruption that under-deters:
A collector (possibly in collusion with the regulated entity) may prefer an
upfront payment for less than the full amount—even where a payment plan
would yield a collection of a greater portion of the fine—in order to speed up
the collector’s own remuneration. But any concern about corrupt collectors
“low-balling” collections is overstated, given that factors warranting penalty
reductions could and should have been incorporated into initial penalty
assessments, and so should not play major roles in collections. The mere fact
that money might corrupt some regulators mandates careful crafting and execution of any rewards regime, not avoiding such a regime altogether.
Objections to rewarding performance at the agency—as opposed to individual collector—level also do not warrant rejection of a performance-based
reward system. First, critics could argue that more funding should be provided
not to agencies with the best collections performance, but to those with the
most room for improvement. However, to incentivize good performance, funding simply cannot be shunted toward weak performers. And performance-based
funding need not disadvantage low-performing agencies, as funding could be
tied to agencies’ showing the greatest improvement or to their demonstrating
strong compliance with best practices, rather than merely to collection rates or
total amounts collected. Second, any collections gains resulting from healthy
inter-agency competition might be offset by losses in agency coordination, as
agencies might undermine each other in order to make themselves look better
as they fight for bigger slices of the appropriations pie. But lack of inter-agency
coordination is already a problem; there is no indication that paying for performance would make that worse. Rather, if performance, not finger-pointing,
earns funding, agencies might cooperate out of self-interest. Third, although
performance-based funding might minimize industry capture, it could exacerbate political capture. That is, the legislature could conceivably exert increased
influence on agency decision making through its selective or conditional distribution of funds. However, it seems unlikely that political capture would reduce
collections in this manner: If lawmakers wanted to deprioritize collections,
directing funding toward high-performing collectors would not be the way to
do it.
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In short, if the root cause of undercollection is misaligned incentives, modifying individual and institutional incentives is likely the most direct—and most
effective—manner of correcting the problem. However, as discussed in the next
section, more radical structural changes could sidestep agency incentive problems altogether.
B. Replace It—Privatize Collections
Tying agency funding or agency staffers’ pay to collections performance is a
major step in the direction toward privatization; thus, actual privatization is the
logical next option. There are several variations on the privatization model,
each with its own potential benefits and risks. As we discuss below, several
general benefits and risks cut across the different models. On the one hand,
privatization can improve incentives to collect more penalty debt by ensuring
collectors have a direct financial stake in the money generated by their collection efforts. On the other hand, some critics could view privatization as an abdication of an important government enforcement function. We conclude that
one form of privatization—delegation of collections duties to private collection
firms—best balances these benefits and drawbacks. However, given the institutional impediments to radical reform, we advocate efforts at intra-governmental
reform before moving to a fully privatized model.
1. Private Collection Firms
Some agencies have experimented with hiring private firms to collect fines
and penalties on their behalf,386 with apparent success.387 Many of the advantag386. GAO, SEC and CFTC 2001, supra note 163, at 12; see Federal Debt Management Are Agencies Using Collection Tools Effectively?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Gov’t Efficiency and Fin. Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong.
7980 (2003) (statement of Richard L. Gregg, Comm’r of Financial Management
Services) [hereinafter Gregg Testimony] , available at https://www.fms.treas.gov/
news/reports/testimony-jun17-2003.html (noting that private agencies under contract with Treasury’s Financial Management Services increased their collections
each of the three years for which data was tracked, collecting over $156 million in
five years); George F. Cole, Fines Can Be Fines—And Collected; Here’s How, Winter 1989 Judges’ J. 5, 9 (noting that an experiment in Snohomish County, Washington demonstrated that private collection agency collected 20.6% of criminal
fines assigned to it; a third-party billing service, 14.3%; and court-generated notices, only 5.7%); Adam Melita, Much Ado About $26 Million: Implications of Privatizing the Collection of Delinquent Federal Taxes, 16 Va. Tax Rev. 699, 705 (1997)
(“Since 1982, private collectors have gathered about $1 billion in delinquent loan
repayments on behalf of the Department of Education.”); see also Melita, supra, at
714 (noting that “[s]tatistical estimates indicate that if the non-tax debts of $48 billion had been turned over to private collectors promptly, nearly $29 billion would
have been recovered”—a recovery rate of about 60%, which is higher than the various agencies’ collection rates in the available federal agency audit reports).
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es of privatizing collections—such as stronger incentives and increased expertise—track the benefits of specializing the collections function and tethering
pay to collections performance within the agency.388 But there are additional
potential advantages. Whereas even well-functioning agencies serve quasilegislative, judicial, and executive functions—they promulgate rules, impose
sanctions for violations of those rules, and enforce those sanctions—private
firms do not have potentially conflicting functions and mandates that can
detract from the collection incentive. Similarly, whereas tying agency funding to
collections effectiveness might jeopardize coordination among agencies, privatization would sidestep the drama: Private firms, unlike interdependent agencies,
need not coordinate with competitors. Further, delegating collections to companies already subject to market forces389 would avoid the difficulties of trying
to restructure regulators’ incentives and financial stakes to essentially simulate
market dynamics within government agencies.390
There are, however, potential drawbacks. In addition to variations of the
unseemliness391 and overdeterrence objections addressed above, there are cost387. See Melita, supra note 386, at 714.
388. One preliminary consideration that agencies face when delegating collections to
private firms is how many firms to hire. If a single firm is effectively granted a
monopoly over an agency’s collections, it may demand too high a price for its services; it may have little incentive to avoid abusive practices; and, despite the profit
motive, it may still not be sufficiently incentivized to act as efficiently as it otherwise would in the presence of competition. The presence of multiple firms alleviates some of these concerns, but could create logistical difficulties regarding how
collections cases are assigned to different firms and how payables are processed
and transferred to the agency. It also creates a risk of inconsistent treatment of
offenders, unless the agency itself dictates and carefully monitors collections practices—an action which threatens to undermine the cost-savings that initially
prompt the shift to private cost-collectors.
Treasury’s Financial Management Services has developed a policy of
contracting with various private collection agencies, which compete against each
other such that those agencies that collect and resolve more debt gain a larger
share of the referred debt portfolio. Gregg Testimony, supra note 386.
389. Firms hired by government agencies to collect debt are not necessarily exposed to
market forces merely because they are private firms. Agencies may engage with
firms in ways that insulate the firms from market forces, such as by retaining
them regardless of their performance and costs. However, at least one agency,
Treasury’s Financial Management Services, has found a way to ensure that hired
firms face competitive pressure. See id.
390. Melita, supra note 386, at 706 (“The agencies most burdened by delinquency are
the ones pushing hardest for increased freedom to contract out [collections], a
trend that may be attributable to the bureaucratic inertia of federal agencies,
compelled to alter their procedures only when the outstanding debt problem becomes severe.”).
391.
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related concerns. First, the private firm’s commission cuts into collections performance gains. But so long as the increases in fines collected (plus the costs
saved by avoiding internal collections) exceed the private firm’s take, the move
should be a net benefit. Moreover, if private firms’ fees are a concern, one solution—already adopted by at least one local agency392—is to build the collector’s
fee into the fine itself as a “surcharge.” This would not pose a significant
overdeterrence concern. If an offender violates a law, the offender, not the government, should pay—not only for any harm, but also for the particular costs of
enforcement against that offender.393 Given that there will always be less than
perfect collection of fines (let alone perfect detection of violations and enforcement of sanctions), the risk of overdeterrence through over-assessment should
be minimal.
Second, private firms’ incentives might exacerbate undercollection in some
instances. Because private firms would receive only a fraction of amounts
recovered, they might eschew collections in cases where the expected recovery
exceeds collection costs, but the expected collector’s fee does not.394 Abandonment of cases within this “blind spot” for private collectors would undermine
deterrence and government revenue generation. Indeed, even government
collectors under the current regime—unrestrained by private collectors’ costbenefit analysis—might collect such fines more effectively. However, as a practical matter, this should not be a significant problem. Private collectors (whether seeking to maintain an exclusive government contract or to compete with
includes enforcement-related responsibilities. Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1302 (2003) (explaining
that adherents of “public law” view “bristle at the notion that government would
seek to avoid . . . obligations by systematically contracting out functions” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishing, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 879, 969 (2004) (“Critics
declare that the privatization of force is an ‘unseemly,’ ‘inappropriate’ delegation
of an ‘inherently public function,’ a function that is ‘the quintessence of the state’s
sovereign power.’”); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts:
Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 947,
978 n.131 (2001) (“In qui tam actions, if the Department of Justice does not intervene, private attorneys can themselves run with the ball. Sometimes the urge to
obtain fees can appear unseemly.”).
392. Moore, supra note 82 (discussing Lawrence County, Ohio’s imposition of fees as
surcharges).
393. Incorporating collectors’ fees into fines might, however, undermine collectors’
incentive to collect fines inexpensively. But administrative agencies could combat
any such effect by soliciting collections work from competing collections specialists. See supra note 388. Competition would undercut each firm’s ability to collect
in an inefficient or overpriced manner.
394. For example, private collectors might rationally forgo collecting a fine with an
expected recovery of $1000, expected collection costs of $500, and a fee of 25% of
the amount recovered ($250).
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rival firms) would have an incentive to pursue collections of some “net negative” penalties just to improve collections rates and keep agencies happy. Moreover, agencies could potentially sidestep the problem by hiring multiple, specialized collection firms, e.g., one for large debts and another for smaller debts.395
Similarly, this form of undercollection could also be avoided by forcing offenders to pay private firms’ collection costs. As argued above, offenders, not
taxpayers, should bear enforcement costs.396 Adding the costs of collections to
the fine is even more appropriate than adding the collector’s fee because costs
perfectly track the harms flowing from an offender’s violation, mitigating the
risk of overdeterrence. Finally, private undercollection could also be minimized
by allowing or requiring private firms to return to referring agencies fines they
choose not to pursue. Under this arrangement, government regulators would
have the option to pursue private firms’ “blind spot” penalties, and no fines
would be abandoned unless both government and private collectors passed on
them. Thus, agencies could elect to promote deterrence by collecting fines even
where they would not necessarily financially profit from doing so.
A third potential drawback to private collection firms is the costs involved
in selecting, monitoring, and coordinating with private firms. Monitoring costs
exist whether collections responsibilities are privatized or not, but these costs
might be increased by the difficulties of monitoring a separate entity rather than
internal personnel.397 Yet that increase might be outweighed by other efficiency
gains.398 Unlike agencies, which largely lack effective collections record-tracking
systems, private collectors (which both have a bottom line and are accountable
to clients) are more likely to have robust systems in place to make both internal
and external monitoring easier and more accurate. In addition, if initial screening adequately tests a private firm’s practices and procedures, less ongoing
monitoring may be necessary.
395. Melita, supra note 386, at 712 (noting that some states “permit private contracts
for specific types of debts, which can be especially costly to collect because of the
smaller sums involved”); id. at 713 (“California has been using a private collection
approach since 1984, specifically targeting small delinquent accounts which the
state cannot afford to pursue otherwise.”).
396. See supra text accompanying note 392.
397. See Oregon Audit, supra note 131, at 5-6 (finding that agencies failed to adequately monitor the multiple private collections agencies under contract with the
state, due at least in part to inadequate staffing, which prevented a determination
of both firm compliance and of the efficiency of the referrals).
398. See Melita, supra note 386, at 713 (“Michigan has been using private collections for
the past ten years. Collections have risen from a modest $29 million in 1986 to
$106 million in 1995. Initially instituted because of the greater technological and
personnel resources that the private collections firms had to offer, the state’s
Commissioner of Revenue has been very pleased with the arrangement.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 720 (“[T]he [Internal Revenue] Service simply cannot
compete with private firms using the latest technological and methodological innovations and who are dedicated exclusively to the practice of debt collection.”).
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Perhaps one of the most significant issues regarding both the effectiveness
and propriety of utilizing private collection firms is timing. In general, the older
a debt, the harder it is to collect,399 so the advantages of bringing in private collectors are muted when they are pursuing very old debt.400 However, even
where agencies do use private firms as a primary collections technique, they
typically only involve them after judgment has been entered or the agency has
assessed the fine. But agencies often do not investigate offender assets prior to
fine imposition or effectively exploit pre-judgment remedies.401 Indeed, if
collections performance is attributed to private agencies, agency staffers may
have even less incentive to optimally investigate assets or use pre-judgment
attachment because poor collections from pre-judgment mistakes will not be
blamed on them.
One seemingly radical solution is to involve private firms even at the prejudgment or pre-fine assessment stage. Private firms would bring their unique
expertise into this process, quickly and effectively analyzing offenders’ assets
and advising agencies regarding whether attachments are worthwhile. Their
incentives to do so might be somewhat attenuated: If no fine has yet been
assessed, firms cannot be compensated on a commission basis at this stage. But
firms can anticipate that the more assets they discover and/or seize, the larger
the fine that they ultimately collect (a share of which they will receive).
Of course, such early involvement raises new risks. Giving private firms
access to regulated companies’ financial data raises confidentiality concerns.402
Private firms’ profit motives may impel them to abuse discovery methods,
exaggerate offender assets, or over-utilize pre-judgment attachment remedies.403

399. Id. at 708 (“[D]ebts which are promptly turned over to a collection agency have a
better chance of being recovered than stale debts.”).
400. See Oregon Audit, supra note 131, at 6-7 (reviewing sampling of debts that were
referred to private collections agencies only after the agencies’ internal collections
units had first spent considerable time pursuing them, and finding that only $200
of $500,000 had been collected).
401. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
402. But see Melita, supra note 386, at 722 (discounting privacy concerns by noting that
“[t]he experience of the Department of Education shows that during the more
than fourteen years that the private collection program has been operating, not a
single privacy complaint has ever been received.”).
403. Indeed, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in large part because of the concern that private collection agencies’ profit motives were driving
them to engage in unsavory and abusive practices. Kara B. Schissler, Note, Come
and Knock on Our Door: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s Intrusion into New
York’s Summary Proceedings Law, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 315, 320 (2000). But see
Gregg Testimony, supra note 386 (reporting, with regard to Treasury’s FMS
referrals to private collections agencies, that there were “no substantiated cases of
[these agencies] using abusive or bullying tactics with debtors under our
contracts”).
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However, protections could be implemented, e.g., collectors could be walled off
from agency personnel with discretion regarding fine assessment. In any event,
use of private firms could potentially minimize abuses because only private
firms, and not the government, are subject to the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act.404 That statute prohibits a variety of different abuses by private collectors.405
Ultimately, the more autonomy granted to private collection firms, the
more effective they will be; but at the same time, concerns about agency abdication of responsibility and the risk of abuses increase. Despite the potential challenges, given the promising evidence about the ability of privatization to boost
collections, experimentation with different levels and modes of agency control
may be worthwhile.
2. Selling Collection Rights
An alternative to hiring for-profit collection agencies is to transfer to
private entities not only the responsibility, but the right, to collect. This could
be accomplished by sale of penalty debt to private bidders. There are several
advantages to such a scheme.
First, selling collection rights would provide the ultimate stake-based incentive. Unlike collection agencies, which receive only a fraction of amounts
collected, or government collectors, who currently receive no share of collected
funds, purchasers of government receivables would keep every dollar collected.
Moreover, this arrangement takes advantage of the “endowment” effect:
Purchasers would be seeking to recover out-of-pocket losses (the sums expended to purchase the debt), and so are more likely to “feel” the loss intensely
and, accordingly, pursue collections more vigorously.406
Second, creating private owners of collection rights would eliminate agency
monitoring and coordination costs. Unlike agency-retained collection firms,
private owners’ relationship with regulators would largely end upon transfer of
the collection right.

404. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C) (2006). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits
various abuses by collection agencies, but exempts state and federal employees
acting within their duties.
[T]his creates a double standard whereby private collectors are more
forthright and less abusive than their counterparts in government. An
even more strange result is that a government agency which contracts out
the collection of a debt to a private collector suddenly transforms the set
of tactics that can be used, bringing the collection activity under the
scope of the FDCPA.
Melita, supra note 386, at 715-16.
405. See Melita, supra note 386, at 715-16.
406. Seidenfeld, supra note 269, at 288.
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Third, there may be some benefit to inviting entities besides private collection agencies to pursue penalty debt. Financially sophisticated firms, like hedge
funds or investment banks, could have an advantage at valuing penalty debt and
determining when to use, and how to structure, payment plans for corporate
debtors. They might also be better at handling “existential fines,” i.e., fines that
could potentially bankrupt debtors. Compared with collection firms, sophisticated bidders may be more familiar with particular industries or with business
dynamics generally, and so may be more effective at determining and negotiating the maximal amount that could be collected without toppling a company.407
On the other hand, the arguable unseemliness of tethering pay to collections performance and of delegating important government duties to private
parties reaches its apogee with auctions of collection rights. Some of the questionable distastefulness could be mitigated by a bidder vetting process: Agencies
could set basic standards relating to collections procedures that would-be bidders would be required to satisfy before participating.408 The agency could also
monitor bidders’ compliance with their requirements on a periodic or ongoing
basis. Of course, as with the other efforts to rein in the risk of abuses,409 the
more stringent the bidding standards or reporting requirements, the more the
advantages of privatization are blunted.410 As always, experimentation may be
the only way to strike the right balance between the competing considerations.
Debt-pricing is another potential concern.411 A sales-based regime would
mean that agencies would receive only the purchase price for the debt, not any
part of amounts actually collected. Of course, if winning bids roughly reflect
sums actually collectible, there should be no concern. Critics might contend
407. Auctions could also potentially enable efficient specialization. In other words,
they could help match the companies best-suited to collecting money from certain types of debtors, e.g., criminal defendants, near-bankrupt corporations, etc.
408. Freeman, supra note 391, at 1317 (noting that agencies can extend public law
norms to private companies by conditioning contracts on compliance with substantive regulations); see also Sarah Rubenstein, Hospitals Put Patients’ Debt Up for
Auction: Collection Agencies Bid Online for Right To Recoup Funds; Worries About
Tougher Tactics, Wall St. J., June 3, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121244901525139563.html (discussing how “[c]ollection firms are vetted for their
tactics and approach to patient needs and concerns before they are allowed to
participate in auctions” in the context of medical debts).
409. See generally Rubenstein, supra note 408 (“Now, some of the same collection
agencies, as well as other firms that purchase debt outright, have begun participating as bidders in online auctions, in which they buy the debt or provide guaranteed payments to hospitals for access to the unpaid accounts. Some experts say
this gives them more reason to aggressively pursue patients in arrears.”).
410. Freeman, supra note 391, at 1339.
411.

Cf. Melita, supra note 386, at 721 (contrasting abuses of an early “tax-farming”
system, where “[t]ypically, tax-farmers were held liable for the total expected tax
revenue, meaning that every dollar not collected was another dollar lost by the
tax-farmer”).
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that bids could undervalue collectible amounts, and could reflect discounts
based on inflated estimates of collection costs. In that case, agencies might
pocket lower revenues than they would have retrieved had they conducted collections themselves. However, in time, competition among bidders should mitigate these risks; there is no reason to think a market-based system for “pricing”
government debt would be less efficient than the current system.
Finally, the costs of implementing a bidding system might overwhelm its
benefits. For example, bidders would expend resources analyzing the value of
debt for sale, including the financial state of offenders, the risks and costs of
collection, and the propriety of payments plans. This costly process would
presumably be duplicated on the other side by agencies identifying an acceptable bidding range. Regulators might reduce such costs by simply accepting the
highest bid without conducting their own pricing analysis, but this raises problems of its own, such as the risk of buyer collusion. Again, a well-developed
market should alleviate this risk; but markets do not become robust overnight.
Because debt auctions would involve a more radical departure from existing prevalent models than the utilization of private firms, more robust evidence
of their promise would be needed before a shift to this model would be warranted.
3. Public Interest Firms
Another radical option, and one that has not been considered in any of the
literature we have reviewed, is for agencies to hire as collectors, or sell the right
to collect fines to, public interest organizations. This alternative could address
the “leakage” problem noted with hiring private collectors or selling collection
rights—namely, that some of the money collected benefits only the private
entity, and fails to promote the interests of the government or the public. Public
interest organizations would, by virtue of their missions, reinvest any profits
from fine collections in pursuing the public good. This approach would also
reduce or eliminate the appearance of unseemliness inherent in transferring
collection rights to purely for-profit enterprises.
However, public interest firms might not be any better incentivized or
equipped than agencies to pursue collections. Public interest firms’ employees
might perceive collections as low-reward, low-priority work. Public interest
firms may lack specialized personnel to effectively conduct collections. They
may even delegate collections to private collections agencies, thus perpetuating
or exacerbating the benefit-leakage problem. And their mandates may diverge
from those of the referring agencies. Thus, any advantages of this system could
well be outweighed by the drawbacks.
C. Summary
For any approach to collection of government fines to be successful, it must
properly align the incentives of those tasked with collections with the interests
of the government and the public. The most promising approach appears to be
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increased use of private collections agencies. Their concrete financial stake
eliminates many of the problems undermining public agencies’ collections
efforts, and so maximizes the deterrence value of fines.412 Because that stake is
inherent in the private firms’ compensation structure, there is no need to engineer what may ultimately be ineffective ways to simulate market forces within
the agencies.
Yet widespread utilization of private collection firms generates logistical
challenges and risks of abuse. Moreover, to maximize the effectiveness of private firms, it may be necessary to utilize them in novel and potentially problematic ways—such as involving them at the pre-judgment stage.
Despite the attraction of private collection firms, in recognition of the
risks—and of the realities of institutional inertia—we would advocate that, as a
general matter, governments should first try reforms within the agencies before
looking outside the agencies for solutions. If an agency segregates and specializes the collections function and communicates its prioritization through
increased pay or other rewards, and collections still do not improve, then the
inability of the agency to address the problem internally will have been squarely
demonstrated.413 At that point, turning to private collection firms will be both
politically and economically defensible.
Of course, agencies will need to improve their recordkeeping and internal
monitoring if their performance is to be fairly assessed in the first place. If they
cannot accomplish even that preliminary step, then moving more quickly to a
privatization regime may be warranted.
As more experiments with different forms of privatization occur, the details
of how to best strike the balance between extracting benefits and minimizing
risks should emerge. Because there are thousands of government agencies owed
untold billions in outstanding fines, the room for such experimentation is vast.
Conclusion
As debates rage about whether and when to impose civil or criminal fines
on corporate and white-collar offenders, or about how large such fines should
be, the fact that only a fraction of the fines imposed are ever collected has drawn
scant attention. The precise magnitude of the problem of undercollection of
such fines is difficult to determine—a state of affairs due in large part to failures
by administrative agencies themselves. What is clear is that undercollection is a
significant problem, and one that is by no means entirely outside the agencies’
hands. Whether policymakers will muster the political will to address the problem is an open question. Quite possibly, articles such as this one, which shed

412.

Cf. Melita, supra note 386, at 725 (“If a tax debtor can escape government collectors—a problem that is growing ever more common—then the public may perceive that a delinquent return is just as good as a timely one.”).

413.

See supra note 371 and accompanying text regarding success of agencies that have
specialized their in-house collections functions.
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light on the scope and seriousness of the problem, may stoke sufficient interest—and public outrage—to create such political will. Should that occur, the
recommendations in this Article may serve as a blueprint to point policymakers
in the direction of reforms with a realistic probability of yielding meaningful
gains.
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